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~OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD ( D., .MONTANA)

DEDICATION OF EAST COAST

~RIAL

NEW YORK, NEW YORK
May

23, 1963

It was not a long time ago, as time goes.

It was scarcely twenty

years ago when it all took place .
In the dawn and in the dusk and through the day, men and wanen went
forth from this nation- - to Africa, to Asia, to Europe, to the South Pacific,
and to all the far places of the world.

Week after week, they went, and month

after month, and year after year.
Before it was done, eight million men and women in battle dress
were outside the borders and, within, millions more were ready to go.

And

behind theiJ1 1 there was a nation vi th a whole people united in coiiiilon purpose.
They came, these men and women in the Armed Forces, fran the farms,
the mines, the desks and the work benches .
from country and town.

They came from slum and suburb,

They came fran Utah and New York, fran Puerto Rico

and Georgia, from all the States and places in the land.

They came from the

long-rooted strains of Americans and fran those so new that even the English
language was still halting on the toogue .
all creeds .

They came in all colors , all faiths,

And they were welcome in all colors, faiths and creeds.

Some came with fierce anger.
came with neither hate nor anger .

Same came W'i th cold hate.

And some

Some lmew why they came and sane did not.

Some came becau se they were told; and some because they told themselves.
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In the end, it did not matter who they were, what they were, what
they did, where they had come from, or why.

They became--all of them--the

sinew and bone and muscle of a mighty arm of a nation.

The nation ' s purpose

was their purpose and it was they who bore the great costs and dangers of
that purpose through the long years of the war .
A common human hope joined these Americans with others, with the
English, with Russians, with Chinese, with Frenchmen and many more.

And,

in the end, this massive force swept, as a great wave, over the ramparts of
the tyrants.

It tore loose a deadly weight from the minds and backs of

hundreds of millions and flung it into the cesspools of history.
And when this force had spent itself, for a brief moment, men and
women throughout the world drank deeply of the meaning of peace and freedom.
Many clutched that moment and held it.

Many soon forgot or were compelled

soon to forget.
And millions of those who had done so much to forge the moment
were not there to live it when it came.
before and same the day before.

Some had fought and died years

They had died in their homes or down the

street or on the edge of town, against a wall, in a ditch, a courtyard or
an open field.

And others had died a long way from home, in an alien land,

or against a vast sky or in the pitch-dark of the sea' s depths.
Countless Americans were among those who did not see the bright
flash of freedom and peace which swept the earth when the conflict ended.
They died in all the places and in all the ways of war ' s death.

Today,

most of them lie here in the earth of America or in a plot apart in other

- 3 nations which is of this nation because they are there.

But for others,

we are not able to provide even a grave wl th a cross or a star to mark
their last traces.
These are the missing.

And it is they who have summoned us.

How much do we know of these missing men, we who stand here today?
We know their names.

We know the numbers they bore in the Arrrry and Air

Force, the Coast Guard, in the Navy and the Marines.
know of them?

Do we know them as a wife, a mother, a father, a sister,

brother or friend might know them?
was

But what do we really

For those close to them, each life lost

as a star in a human universe, a star whose light was bright for awhile

and then, in a moment, ceased to burn.
We cannot know that world, we who stand here, that closed but
infinite world of each man 1 s circle .

What we can know, What all in this

nation can know, and all the world 1 s people should know, is that these
deaths are a debt yet to be redeemed.

And those whau we could not even

bury are of its pledge .
Let us not delude ourselves .
words today.

We do not pey the debt with these

We do not end it with these steles of granite pointed towards

the sey nor with names struck upon stone.
We seek the words to praise these men and they are wanting .

We

search to express our thanks to these men and even the genius of the sculptor
is not enough.

- 4 The debt remains unpaid.
needed by these men whom we honor.

What we do and sa:y here today is not
It is needed by ourselves .

to remind us that the debt is unpaid.

It is needed

For these men whose names we record,

and the countless others throughout the world whose passing was marked or
umnarked, did not die for words of praise or memorials of stone.

They died

that those who lived might have a chance to build this nation strong and wise
in justice and in equity for all, in a world free, at last, from the tyrants
of fear, hate and oppression.
It was a long time ago, as time goes, that they died.
twenty years but fifty years ago or a century or a millenium.

It was not
For they died,

not only on the Normandy Beachhead but at Verdun, at Gettysburg, at Valley
Forge and in all the places and in all the times that the human right to be
human has been redeemed.
If we would honor these dead, then- -all of them--if we would praise
them, if we would repay them, let us ask ourselves what we have done with
this chance which they have given us.

And let us ask ourselves again and

again what we have done until there is, in this natimand in this world,
the need to ask it no longer.
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was then on the faculty of Butte High School and vbo w.s tl
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coura.~

oource of
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and the dotemiMticm which I n eded to achic

the goal of a high school gradu:lte even though 1t ws w1 thout the privilege
of a graduation.

I have

al~s

felt a sense of loss --a kind of gap in

~

life--

at never hav1D.g experienced what you graduates are now experiencing.

It

seems to me that o. high school cOlllllCncement is a unique and vonderful
moment.

It is a time to remember achievements aa well as disappointments.

I t is o. time to remember your efforts and your faculty ' s efforts to open
new doors for your development.

It is a time to remember the warmth of

the friendships which you ho.-"e made and which I know you hope to keep.

It

is a time to remember the 1mderotanding and encouragement and, yes, the
anxieties of your parents and relatives and friends who have shared trese
yea:rs with you.
It is--a commencement--a moment to telescope the experiences of
the precedins years and to fix for all time in memory what is now a Wlique
segment of your past.

And it is-·a commencement--a. moment to recognize

that the curtains of the future are opening once again on a new setting,
even as they did when you entered high school and, further back, when you
set foot in school for the first time.
If you think about it, you will realize that each time the cur-

tain9 have opened in this wa:J on a

ne'~

phase you have been more fully

equipped by your accumulated eJq>erlence and education to assume a greater
responsibility for making your own way.

At the same time, each phase has

brought new possibilities, new challenges and ne-..r uncertainties.
At a mCI!IeDt like this, I am sure that each of you has his own

thoughts and feelings about the fUture.

They are individual and personal.

And I vould not presume to intrude., except to urge you to include in them

a determination to continue to seek education in college or wherever else
'1IJey'

be appropriate for you.

Take another measure for t'he changes which have occurrad in the

mtion.

Montana was admitted to the Unicn in 1889 as the 41st State.

as the number of States has expanded to

f'i~ty,

Even

their boundaries have been

stretched across 2,000 miles of water to Hawaii and north to Alaska and the

Arctic Circle.

In 1889 when Montana became a State, the Un:t ted States was

at peace with all ne.tiong abroad.

The Armed Forces totaled 40,000 men,

virtually all of whom were in garrisons within the
To~,

continent~

limits.

the United States is also, in a strict interpretation of the wcrd,

at peace.
tmiform.

But today, there are

t-.10

and a. ha.lf million men and

wo~!l

in

Another million men and wancn work ao civilians in the Defense

Establishment in order to keep these Armed Services in a state of read:i.ness.
Four hundred thousand man and 'W'OlDCn of the Armed Services arc stJ.tloned in
Western Europe.

That, alone,

when Montan'l became a State.

~s

ten times greater than the entire n1Jlllber

And. oan.y nore thousands are in the Western

Pacific and elsewhere in the ·io:dd.
Take still other measures f or the changes in the world.

A

quarter of a century ago--say, ln 1935--almoot all o:f Africa and nn.tch of

Asia was in a st.!lte of political dependency on Wes\;ern Europe.

These areas

were, for the moot part, passive colonial regions wit.h li.ttle direct influ-

ence or voice in what was transpiring elsewhere in the world.

Todey) all

of Asia and most of Africa are c a:xposed- -as you well knm.r-·of' inOOI>cndent
nations with varying degrees o:f influence and a most emphatic voice in the
affairs of the world.

A quarter or a century ago, in 19351 the United States exported

to th... rest of the world, prothlct and servic
wortb $2.3 billion and imported $2 billion.

or ooe k1Dd or azaother
I u 1962, we elq)Orted $21.6

billi<Xl and imported $16.4 billioo.

quarter or a century ago, the t1n1ted States vas concerned

A

about tbe Great

~re

aion from which 1t had DOt yet emerged. It the

Un1 ted States thoueht

t oll tib

so::-.u-1 ty 1D the vorld, 1t vas a

t 1t

concern prompted. by t.h... rapid growth of :m111tal'i

in

Ge..~,
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Ita:cy' end.,. vith it, c. deepcnlng bostU1ty to t.ha United tate .
f'iw year
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un ...ven and State
atteDtion of
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110 t
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a!l
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But the

it one

1'hct predcm1o:mt concern bas beeo

i th Dational oocurity and v1 tb Canm1 sm,

p1·acticed 1D R\u ia o · Cb1Da

or Cuba, or as it niGht b .... pur u ... d 1D tha Onitad tata .
A quarter of

eentu."""

aco,

the peak of unc:ooqoorod Moullt ITerest--

29,000 feet 1n tho clo"..tdo·-beckon.ld to tho adventuroo .

239,000 mile :tn pace-range

or

Toda;y

the
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becm brollcJht by ci c ... and teclmol.OQ' iDto the

the dar1nc.
11h&t I ho.vc cited ere but a. few dramatic 1Ddicat1ons of the kinds

or change which our eOI!tnUllity-etotc, :nation and vorld bs.vo undergcme, withiD
the lifetime or cooe pre ent toilay.

Indeed, the ol<ler people hare cu

any Dtllber of' othor contrasts to the

~1st

add

out of their persOD&l experiences.

As I noted, change is not a new factor in human existence.

the cha.Dge of our times is different fran what has gone before.
in velocity.

Yet

It differs

And it differs in l"aage--.J.n the great range of human activity

in which it applies.

The net result is that each of us as an individual

has trouble trying to keep up with it, and, even,more, in trying to exerciae
control over 1ta influence on us.

For 1 t is the kind of change which,

whether we wish it or not, intrudes deeply and persistently in our personal
lives.
Speaking for

~self,

I must confess in all honest, that I could

do with a little less change and a little slower pace.
of wishful thinking.

But that is a kind

There is no stopping the world, even if we would want

to get off.
The fact is that the forces which are producing this change of our
times are immense and universal.

It they are not very controlable by indivi-

duals they are not much more controlable by any individual community or State

or, indeed, by any individual naticm. Rather

than to look back wistfull.y at

the past, then, we have no choice but to live with the present and do what
we can--each of us in his own

~--to

help the cazmuDity-state and the nation

to shape the future for the greatest possible well-being of those who live
~and

will live in emerging generations in this changing setting.

And if

we are to do this, we have got to grasp clearly, in our understanding, the
major forces lrhich are canpelling the change, the Wlique change of our times.
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:fact that l!l8ZlY oi' our great ana.

and even our ama.l.ler c1ti a ere rushing h
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count1eoo oth r difticultica

ociatad largely with popul.atioo concentratiOD.

The grovth of population 8lld the expanding concept of the atalldard

ot 11vi.Dg
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to the clla.D6• of our t

Jor factors in oetting
.

motion still anoth r stillulus

The vorld not only has to uppl.y a

tl.y increased

ar1ount of goode and cervices but, in order to do eo, it haD to briDe people
and raw m:terio.lo frcm great dlotanc
the finiobcd proaucto ov r vast distsnc

to produce th

and 1 t has to distribute

This bas l(td to

scientific and

technological revolution in transpo rta.tt. on and communications.
in this StattJ--in almost simultaneou.o eamuunic ation vith
the nat1oo and vorld.
on

e~

We are now--

ry other part of

I ndeed, i t there wre radio receivers- -as ve kno

Venuo, ve could CCJD!IlliDieat e vi t.b that planet.

th•--

Major Cooper ' s recent tligbt

resulted amcmg other t.hings, in clear photographs of thotl.Gands of square
miles of the earth' s surface in a single shot.

Telstar, the cammmi cations

satellite, caat the 'l'V story of his i'light simultaneously i n the United
States and Europe .
Insofar as transportation is concerned, we can sense the immensity
of the change by noting that half-a-century ago there was a total of about
500,000 motor vehicles in the United States and not too many roads fit to
carr¥ them 81JY great distance.

Today, there are 75 million vehicles and

the States are knit together with an intricate and growing system of superhighways.

Jlor is this change confined to the United States •

Throughout

Western Europe, in Latin America, and in Tol<;yo and

Jlll1ey

African cities the autanobile is now amipresent.

And this symbol of the

other As ian and

rapid and vast movement or peoples will becane, no doubt, universal in the
near future.
Motor vehicles, of course, are only a part of the story.

To cite

another of many changes, conmercial jets flying various national flags, as
you know, cross the oceans countless times a day and in a matter of hours •
And, ironically, in some of the more remote parts of the world, these planes
are serviced by locally trained and expert mechanics who have never seen a
tram.
Bow these cbanges, and others like them, add up to a high degree
of human contact and interdependency.

It is, moreover, an ever- increasing

contact and interdependency between the peoples ot camnuni ties and the
States, and significantly, between the peoples of ma.ny nations.
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But let there be no doubt o:f' 1 to i'undamental va.lid.i ty.
it is for ourselves, it is valid for

~

mankind.

Even as

Even as tbia ideal was

valid at t."le Ut:e of the American Revolution it is val.id :ln our own time
and in the tiDe which is yet to come.

Indeed, yau. ma;y count on 1 t being

very much :tn the forefront of' world dev.alopments t.hroughout your lifetime.
As a. :final major charact-;ristic of the change of our 't:J.oes 1 1

uould point out that the C<H"'lta.ct amonB peoples and among nations during the
past qua!"ter

or a centur,y has also brought with it one c;reat negati"Ve result.

It has brought an :inCI'f!aGC in huz:mn hostility.

Whatever the compotmd of fear 1

lack of underatand..:lng, aggressivencs:J and arrogance which has produced t.his
hostility, it is a most dAngerous phenomenon .

unique to the contemporary

~rorld.
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response to it, millta:ry weaponG of Q.uick and overuhelming d.evastfl.tion.
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the brink of World War III.
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August 13, 1963STATEMENT OF SENA'IOR l·1IKE MANSFIELD (D., MO!lTANA)
CIIINESE-RUSSIAN CONVERGENCE IN ASIA

Mr . President:
Ther2 are

obvirr~s

reasons of health and skyrocketing costs of

armaments which provide common or parallel motive3 for the Soviet Union
and the Uuited States to have sought the Test Ban Treaty.

Beyond the

obvious, other interests have undoubtedly entered into the search for
agreement by each nation.
but

nev~rtheless

benefit

c~

These are not necessarily shared interests

they are a part of the

calculatio~s

of the balance of

which the Treaty rests.

It

see~s

to me that the Senate should explore all of these

factors in an effort to understand fully what is at stake in the act of
ratification.

Reference, for example, has already been made in the

hearings before the Foreign Relations Ccmmi ttee to the growing estrangement between Russia and China.
an awareness of what may be a

That the question has been raised suggests
~ost

significant factor in the Soviet posi-

tion on the Nuclear Test Ban Trre ty.

Yet our knowledge of the Russian-

Chinese estrangement is too limited to permit a full comprehension of its
implications either for Soviet policy or our
reportorial coverage of the U.S . S.R. ,
extremely limited and spasmodic .

o~~.

particular~

For one thing, our
east of the Urals, is

For another, our knowledge of what is

transpiring in China comes to us largely second- or third-hand.
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It is understandable, therefore, that the Sino-Soviet estrangement has been analyzed in the press and elsewhere largely in theoretical
terms.

Scholars, journalists and intelligence

technicians pore over

the documentation and statements and reports which emanate from Russia and
Chj.:1a.

ADd in this fashion, the estra.P.gement is interpreted to the :cation

almost wholly in terms of ideological differences and the struggle to claim
the high-priesthood of orthodoxy in the international Corrmrunist movement
and with it, I suppose, the right to preach the eulogy at the burial of
Capitalism.
These ideological factors are undoubtedly deeply involved and I
would not for a moment underestimate them .

Sut if I may be so bold a3 to

suggest it, it seems to me that the great emphas is which is given to them
in the information which reaches the government and the public may produce
a serious distortion of our concept of the actual situation.
the problem largely as a clash of Marxist theories or

l·le may see

Commv~ist

personali-

ties which is destined to disappear as soon as the theories are straightened
out or the present leaders, in time, go the way of all leaders.
I should like to suggest that other, more mundane and enduring
considerations are involved in present Sino-Soviet difficulties, considerations which will not easily be exorcised either by new theories or new
leaders.
It is to one of these considerations that I direct the attention
of the Senate today .

It may well be the most significant factor, in the

Russian-Chinese estrangement, largely overlooked in the overwhelming
emphasis which has been given to the ideological differences between
Moscow and Peking.

I refer to the geographic and cultural convergence of

Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian continent.
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This convergence, Mr . President, has been a source of intermittent
friction between the two countries for a very long time.

It has persisted

irrespective of the ideological inclinations of Moscow and Peking at any
given time in history.
and even Russia.

It long predates the advent of

C~ism

in China

Indeed, it predates the birth of Karl Marx by at least

a century .
The first recorded clashes between Russians and Chinese go back
to the 17th century .

Three hundred years ago, Russian traders and Cossacks

first made contact with the outposts of
the region north of

Chinese-~~chu

'Ihe early

ll.a~churh:..

authority in this desolate northeast

zo!l~

cor1~r

imperial power in

of Russian influence and

of Asia, as against China, was

established by a series of treaties begi:ming with thct o1' Nerchinsk in
1689, and followed by Bur
Kiakhta protocol in 1792.

~d Kial'~"lta

in 1727, Kiakhta in 1768, and the

A half-century later the Russia!l press southeast-

ward was resumed under Count rakolai Murcviev-lu:rursky, the Governor Get:eral
of Eastern Siberio., and his chief military aid, Capta.in Gennadii Ivanovich
Nevelskoi.

Again there followed a ccnsolidation of the Russian position,

in the Treaty of Aigun of 1858.
large arer.s of

1~ortheast

This agreement brought into Russien possesion

Asia •.vhich had previously been under 14anchu control.

Subsequently, Russia as well as other European powers and Japan
exacted by guile, bribery or naked power, special economic privileges and
territorial concessions from weak and corrupt imperial officials of China.
By this process, the Russians

pe~etrated

south into

~mnchuria,

establishing

themselves at Dairen at:d Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea by the end of the
19th century and

penetrati~g

Korea which had been for a long time in a

tributary relationship with Peking .

- 4 Since that high-water mark, Russian influence in Northeast Asia
at the expense of China ·}lls fluctuated.

In the face of a Japanes e advance

and the weakness of the early Soviet state, it receded.

Under the Communism

of Stalin it advanced once more at the end of World War II.

And under the

Communism of Khrushchev it receded once more after the Chinese Communists
came to power in Peking.
Our sources of information are insufficient to provide a clear
delineation of where the present line of convergence may lie, as between
Russian and Chinese influence in Northeast Asia.

\ole

are not even sure of

what the precise situation in this connection may be in Kcrea where we are
deeply involved, let alone in Manchuria, of \vhich we know very little.

One

thing is reasonably certain, however, the actual Russ ian-Chinese conversion
does not bear much relationship to t he border-demarcations as shown on
ordinary maps.

It is also clear, in any event, that the convergence in

the Northeast is still much further south and east of any line \-Thich would
have been recognized by a Ching emperor of t he l>fa.nchu Dynasty in the 17th
century, the 18th or early 19th century.
The

rece~t

history of the Chinese-Russian convergence in Northeast

Asia has been affected, of course, by the appearance of Communist ideology
in Russia and China.

But sufficient experience is now accumulated to

suggest that the future history of the region will hardly be dominated by
this factor.
And the history of the Northeast, a history of Russian advance
and recession and advance- - sometimes warlike and imperious and sometimes
peaceful and concj.liatory--finds parallels elsewhere in Central Asia.
During the last century, for example, Mongolia was entirely under nominal
Chinese sovereignty.

It was largely the efforts of Russians under the

Czars coupled with the weakness of the later Manchu-Ching emperors which

- 5 brought about a loo:>ening of Chinese control over the vast stretches of
land now

ide~tified

as the Outer Mongolian People's Republic.

And it was

largely the same ccmbination of Soviet strength and Chinese weakness under
the Chinese National Republic which resulted in 1922, in the establishment
of an Cuter f.fongolia, not only independent of China but brought progressively
into a relationship, apparently in the nature of a protectorate, with the
U. S.S. R.
South and west of Outer Mcneolin we find in Sinkiang the same
flow, ebb and flow of Russian influence.

Here, as elsewhere there was for

centuries a tradition of Chinas c zuzeraint-; ovo3r small principalities of
tribal peoples.

But here as elsewhere this suzerainty has

devoid of significance in the

abse~ce

assert it.

cent~ 1

Thus, in the last

bee~:

quite

of stroug Chinese central power to
the Southwest edges c:f Sinkiang were

chipped away and added to what is new the contiguous terri tory of the
U.S . S. R.

And even as recently as World War II the Russians exercised for

a time something close to indirect dominaticn over principal trading centers
and caravan

junctio~s

in Sinkiang.

Especially, since the advemt of Chinese Communist control over
the

mai~land,

the line of convergence as betwe2n Russia and China in the

Sinkiang area has apparently been pushed back westward once again.

But

how far and how firm this recession of Soviet influence has been, we do
not really know with any degree of accuracy .
To recapitulate, l-11'. President, I have sought to point out to the
Senate, that, historically, there has been not a fixed but a shifting and
uncertain line of convergence between Rnssia and China in the inner recesses
of the Asian continent.

This line, Mr. President, is not necessarily the

border as shown on contemporary maps but rather the changing extremity of

- 6 the eastward and southward reach of Russian influence and the westernmost
and northernmost extension of enforceable Chinese control.
Further, history indicates that while there have been periods of
stalemate and recession, the over-all pattern in the region for several
centuries was that of Russian advance.

It was an advance which paralleled

roughly the spastic but steady decay of the Manchu-Ching dynasty through
the reigns of a number of emperors.

And it drew strength from the debili-

tation of the successor Chinese Republic in l·Tor ld \-lar II and the collapse
of the Japaneae intrusion on the As ian mainland in that conflict.
\-Jhat proru--pts me to make thes.o. observations at this time, Mr.
President, is that they may be of more than historic interest in the light
of the present Sino-Soviet estraugement.

This break comes at a time when

there has emerged in Peki::lg once again, a stroug ceutralization of Chinese
power.
Marxism .

To be sure, the government '1-Thich wields this power proclaims its
Indeed, it claios to be more Merxist than Moscow.

as Chinese Marxism is expressed

i~

Yet insofar

practice on the borders of China, it

appears to bear a remarltable resemblance to classic Chinese dynastic policy.
There are strong indications, for example, that the present
Chinese government is not disposed to regard any of its borders--at least
none fixed after the time of the advanced decay of the Ching Dynasty--as
permanently constricting on the
..

•

•

o~tward

extension of its power.

That such

<o

is the case is indicated by the Chinese assertion in Korea, in Viet Nam,
in Laos, in Tibet and beyond Tibet into Ladakh

a~d

the Northeast Frontier

Agency at the two extremities of the Indian sub-continent.
\-Jhat, then, of the Sino-Soviet border regions?
to be affected by the reassertion of Chinese power?

Are these, too,

I have already referred

to the recession of Soviet influence in Manchuria and Sinkiang, although

- 7 to what extent and how voluntarily it has occurred, we do not know with any
degree of precision.

But whatever its extent, it would be a relatively

minor recession should the Chinese assertion against the U. S. S. R.,

inti~~,

parallel its policies with regard to Koren, Southeast Asia and the ChineseIndian border region.

If there is this parallel then the Chinese claim

against the U.S .S . R. could conceivably extend out of Sinkiang, through the
Soviet Pamire to Afghanistan.

It could also embrace all of Outer 1-iongolia

and the Soviet Maritime Provinces along the Pacific.

For these areas fell

....-t thin the reach of ?>1ancl.u China in the heyday of the dynasty .

It is interes ting to note in this connection,

~u·.

Pres ident, that

when Mr. Khrushchev, late last year, taunted the Chicese Communists for
accepting the presence of colonialists in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 1-isce.o while
urging him to act against the United States, he was answered in an editorial
on March 8 in the Chinese People's Daily and Red Flag which rends in part
as follows:

"During the hundJ:ed or so yean preceding the victorious

Chinese Revolution, the

colo~ial

and imperialistic

po~ers--Jclle

USA, Great

Britain, France, Czarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal--became unreservedly engaged in a
campaigr. cf aggression against China.

They imposei on the various regimes

of the old China numerous unequal treaties:

The Treaty of Nanking in 1842;

the Treaty of Aigun in 1858; the Treaty of Tsientsin in 1858; the Treaty of
Peking in 1860; the Treaty of Ili in 1881; the Convention for the Extension
of Hong

Ko~

in 1898; the Treaty of 1901; etc ....

By virtue of these

unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the North, South, East
and West; or they caused territories to be ceded to them on lease along
the coast of China and even in the Chinese hinterlann ....

When the People's

Republic of China was founded in 1949, our Government cl early stated its

- 8 intention of eventually re - examining all the treaties concluded by previous
Chinese regimes with foreign governments and, according to their respective
texts, either recognizing, denouncing, revising or renegotiating them at
the appropriate time."
Note, Mr. Pres ident, the reference in this catalogue of unequal
treaties to the Treaty of Aig1rn which fixed the present-day boundaries in
Manchuria at China•s expense and to Russia 1 s advantage.
junction therew·i th this paragraph in the same editorial:

And note in con"Certain persons

(an obvious reference to Mr. I<hrushchev) w·ould like us to raise the question
of the unequal treaties here and now....

Have they realized what the con-

sequences of this might be?"
The implication is clear, Mr. President.

The Chinese regard

certain Soviet territories no less than Hong Kong and Macao and Formosa as
having been taken inequitably from China and subject, therefore, to
Chinese claim.
Hmr, Mr . President, I do not wish to leave the impression that

China is about to embark upon a general war with Russia to bring back into
the historic embrace of Peking, certain lands along the inner Asian borders.
But I do suggest that the arrow-tips of Chines e influence are already
pointed outward from Peking into these sparsely inhabited regions whose
predominant population is neither Chinese nor Russian but Mongol and other
tribal peoples .

Many techniques are already apparently operating to this

end i ncluding the Chinese aid-programs in Outer Mongolia and the organization
of automonous tribal groupings on Chinese territory.

Certainly such limited

information as we have with respect to the region hint at the likelihood
that the Chinese arrows have begun to prick the Russians in these remote
regions .
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I would suoge st further, Mr. President, that Soviet foreign policy
is not formed in ignornnce of these recent developmentc or the history which
I have just recounted, or of the actiono of the Chinese in Southeast Asia
and on the Indian border .

And there i s no reason to asstur.e that because it

is Communist, Russian foreign policy is concerned any less with such considerations than might be the case with the foreigr. policy of any other nation.
I would suggcs t, finally, that it is becoming apparent that we
have been in error in assuming for so long that the iron-hand of Moscow was
so unshakeably fixed on Peking that it had superceded all other factors for
all time in the considerations of the
Comffi~ist

C~nist

leaderc in Chine.

Theoretical

world unity, whatever its weight, has not replaced certn·n enduring

factors in the relationships of Russia and China es they are indicated to
us by history.
And

o~e

of these factors, perhaps, the most significant, as I

ha"-e tried to explain to the Senate today, 1G the convergence of Russian
and Chinese influence

il1

the vast inner recesses of Asia.

'nle problems

which are posed by the convergence ere not e ssentially those of
theory .

¥~rxist

And tl:.ey certainly are not those of a ccllli!Ion border dispute .• that

is, whether to move the markers n few yards or a few miles in one direction
or the other.

What is involved is the ultimate disposition and utilization

of a reserve of millions of square miles of territory,lnrgely devoid of
human habitation.
This land and its contents constitute an enormous and largely
unexplored and unexploited resource.

Heretofore, it may have been of minor

importance because of the inadequacies in techniques of modern development
and transportation, particularly in that part of the world.

But with the

rapid dissemination and multiplication of these techniques, the region

- 10 grows rapidly in significance to the two great peoples which converge upon
it.

And it grows, too, in significance, as the population of China, already

in the vicinity of 700 millions, expands explosively and presses ever more
heavily on limited resources even for a bare minimum of food, clothing and
shelter.
So, Mr. President, if we wish to understand fully the motives of
the Soviet Union in seeking a nuclear test ban treaty, we ought not to
overlook the factor of the Sino-Soviet convergence, a factor which is
clearly indicated by history but which cannot be weighed accurately without
a better understanding of what is

prese~tly

transpiring in interior Asia.

In any event, it would be unwise to dismiss the likelihood of a
growth of tension at various points of contact along the thousands of miles
of this vague frontier.

Some might anticipate with relish the prospects of

these clashes, even if they were nuclear.

That

p~ospect

might be bent and

twisted, I suppose, into an argument against the proposed Treaty to ban
nuclear tests.
But that, Mr. President, would be a most distorted
realities and contemporary international relations.

vie~•

of nuclear

For, if the flames of a

great nuclear conflagration are lit, it will matter little who holds the
match or where in the world it is struck.

Even the vastness of Central Asia

would be insufficient to contain the holocaust or to confine it to the two
massive Communist powers of Eurasia.

No, Mr. President, the probability of

increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet convergence, as in the case of all
significant international tensions, is one more reason for seeking to bring
about rational control over the growth and spread of the immense destructive
power of nuclear weapons.

- 11 -

Rather than an argument aBoinst this Treaty, then, this probable
tension in Sino-Soviet relations is an argument for this nation to seek to
improve its ccmprehension of the actual situation which exists in Central
Asia .

For that region and what transpires in it is likely to have a most

profotuad significance in a world in which the peace and security of this
nation is closely interwoven with that of all others.

NUClEAR TEST

BA~I

TREATY

t-fr . President:
For several 'treeks, the Senate has had the proposed Treaty on
iluclear TestinJ.

The question has been examined intensively not only by

the Comoittee on Foreizn Relations but also by members of the Armed Services
Conmittee and the Senate members of the Committee on Atomic Energy, all of
whom Here invited to participate in tt.e hearings .
There has been in proce::;::;, in ::;hort, a very thorough Senate consideration of tl:e propoced Treaty .

The specific questions have

a~·ead.y

been asked and o.nsuercd, a::; far as it has been possible to ar.swer them.
The specific doubts
l-Ie

~ave

been rai5ed and, as far as possible, laid to rest .

are now approaching a point at Yhic!:

question in solitary conscience .

'tTe

must put the penultii:la.te

It is thin decision

which will

prodt~ce

the

final vote by \lhich the Senate will either give or \rithhold consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty .
The issue now is not whether Gennany mistrustc; the Treaty or
France mistrusts it more or Communist China most of all .
The issue, nm.,, is not solely the meaning of the Treaty for health
and human genetics, or for military strategy or for the technology and costs
of scientific arms-competition .
All these issues and others have been considered in the painstaking interrogation of the past few weeks .
ficance .

Each has its own unique signi-

But each is a fragment of the pentutimate question and must be

so regarded if we are to reach sound decision .
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For the question which now confronts us is the one question which
is the sum of the many questions. And a rational response to it can only.
be the sum of the many responses, weighed in the scale of such wisdom and

judgment as each of us may possess.

The attitude of no single expert or

group of experts in or out of government, no single official or group of
officials of this government, no single scientist or group of scientists
can be controlling on this question.

The question is for us alone to decide.

It is not for any scientist, military leader, cabinet secretary or whatever
to decide for us.

It remains now· for elected Senators to decide for them-

selves, to confirm or refuse to confirm the judgment of an elected President.
This penultimate question which confronts us is simply stated:
Does the proposed Treaty serve, on balance, the interests of the

peopl~

of the United States, when those interests are considered in their tota.l.ity1
Or to put it negatively:

Is the proposed Treaty, on balance, inimical to

the interests of the people of the United States?
If it is inimical, obviously, the President should not have had .
the Treaty signed in the first place and,
now

con~ent

to its ratification.

c~rtainly,

the Senate should -not

But if the Troaty passes even a minimal

test, if reason tells us that, on balance, the Treaty is not inimical to
this nation, then that alone would seem to be
approving it.

sufficien~

grounds for

For if we mean what we say when we speak of supporting the

leadership of the President, irrespective of party, in his great national
responsibilities in foreign relations, we must mean, at least, that in
matters of this kind, we are inclined to give him tho benefit of

tho-~

vague and residual hesitancies by which each of us in his own way may be
possessed.
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And may I add, l1r . President 1 that I do not see how any Senator
can vote either for or anainst this Treaty uith a cease of abzolute assurance.
In any ma.jor essay in

forei~<:n

relations there are bound to be hesitancies .

They would be there if we debated the proposed Treaty or any ma,lor issue, a
month, a year or a decade .
There ,.,ere doubts and hesitancies when u Republican Congress voted
a Marshall Plan under a Democratic President .
tancies when a Democratic Congre3s voted a
Republican President.

There were doubts and hesi-

~Iiddle

East Resolution under a

The doubts are there year in and year out when Con-

gress conaiders the foreign aid prograc .

For the simple truth is that there

are no certainties, no absolutes in siGnificant matters of foreign relations .
Indeed, were there no doubts on this guestion of a nuclear test
ban that in itself

~ould

be cause for the deepest concern .

For the absence

of any doubt would suggest either a danserous delusion or an insipid insignificance in the Treaty.
The truth is that there are
foreign relations .

risl~s

in this as in any venture in

But I remind the Senate that there are also risks in

failing to venture, in standing still in a world which docz not stand still
for us or any natio 1 .

And at this moment in the world 1 s time, the risks of

a paralyzed uncertainty may be far greater than those which mir.;ht stec from
the pursuit of this venture .
Indeed, there is a strong presumption that such must be the case .
I say that, Mr . President 1 because this proposed Treaty is no instant fancy 1
no sudden concoction .
cision.

We have not arrived in haste at this point of de-

The active pursuit of a Treaty to ban nuclear tests began many

years ago under the Administration of President Eisenhower .

The previous

administx·ation was not passive and negRtive in its approach.

It sought a
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treaty in a most active and positive fashion.

Indeed, the former Vice

President journeyed to Moscow in 1959 in an effort to further this objective, among others, of United States foreign policy. And in a letter
dated April 13, 1959, President Eisenhower wrote Mr. Khrushchev that:
"The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance
of nuclear weapons tests."

Note, Mr. President, the phrase "strongly seeks."

In short, Mr. President, the search for a nuclear test ban treaty
was clearly a cardinal element in the foreign policy of the nation during
the second Eisenhm·Ter Administration.

\·Then Mr. Kennedy assumed office, he

did not have to continue that search.

He could have abandoned it.

have ignored the efforts of the previous Administration.

He could

He could have

turned his back on the affirmations in favor of a nuclear test ban treaty,
as they were contained in the platforms of both parties during the 196o
Presidential campaign and upon which
office.

~1r .

Kennedy and Mr. Nixon stood for

That is a prerogative of the Presidency and Mr. Kennedy could have

exercised it had he judged, after a full examination of relevant information,
that the policy was detrimental to the interests of the nation.
But Mr. Kennedy did not so find.

On the contrary, he pursued

the matter even as Mr. Eisenhmver had done before him.

And he continued

to pursue it, in spite of repeated set-backs and frustrations not unlike
those undergone by his predecessor, until an agreement was, at last,
initialed by his distinguished agent, the Under Secretary of State, Mr.
Averell Harriman on July 25, 1963.

That agreement, I would note in order

to emphasize its non-partisan nature, is more closely in accord with the
concept of a nuclear test ban as it is contained in the Republican Party's
Presidential Platform in 1960 than it is with the similar plank in the
Democratic Party's Platform.
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It is conceivable that one President of the United Gtatcs may
tave mic.iudged the American interest in this highly significant matter
althou~l

I do not for a moment suRSest that such was the case with

President Eisenhower .

But I find it most difficult to believe that two

Presidents in succe::;sion would be RUilty of netQigcnce or poor .1udgment
on precisely the same question of national interest .

:io , z.tr . President,

there is a strong presumption that a test ban treaty is not Only not
inimiial to the interents of the people of the nation but is to their
positive advantage.
Further, Hr . President, vhen members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Counnittee on Armed Service::; and the Senate members of the
Joint Cot:li!littee on Ato:r.ic EnereY probe every vord, co!mla and period of the
text of the Treaty, vhen they examine every conceivable implicatioc of the
Treaty for days on end, when they hear countless relevant witnesses of the
Executive Branch, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Director of the C. I .A. give sober but unmistakable support for this
Treaty, uhen the committees summon for testimony not only the advocates
of this Treaty but its most articulate competent opFonents--in short,
when the treaty is ::;ubjected to the most stringent Senate Committee scrutiny
and the great preponderance of' informed testimony is favorable, there is a
strong presumption thnt the Treaty is in the positive interests of the
United States .
And yet, l.fr . President, a strong presumption is not enough in a
matter of this kind .

Each Senator has an individual responsibility to

examine this Treaty for himself in the light of his own conscience and
his own concept of the interests o£ his state and the nation .

- 6 -

The Senator from Montana has done so. And having done so, he
is per suaded that the proposed Treaty does no violence to but, on the
contrary, serves the interests of the people of his state and the nation.
It serves those interests, immediately and tangibly, in matters
of public health as they may involve a resident or a child yet to be born
I refer, Mr. President, to

in Montana or in anyone of the fifty states.

the question of radiation which, as an uninvited but ever-present spectator, has haunted these hearings of the last few weeks.

To be sure, there

may be a lack of certainty among scientists and doctors on the precise
effects of man-made radiation on health and the human species.
there be no mistake about it.

There is a

mini~al

But let

concept of the dangers

of radiation from which reputable scientific and medical opinion does not
depart.

It is expressed very clearly in the unanimous report of the

United Nations Scientific Committee on the Facts of Atomic Radiation,
17th Session of the General Assembly, 1962.
from 15 nations, including France, the

In this report, scientists

~nited

States, the Soviet Union,

the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada recorded their unanimous agreement
that:
"The exposure of mankind to radiation from increasing
numbers of artificial sources including the worldwide
contamination of the environment with short and longlived radio-nuclides from weapons tests calls for the
closest attention particularly because the effects of
any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully
manifested for several decades in the case of somatic
disease and for many generations in the case of genetic
damage. There should be no misunderstanding about the
reality of genetic damage from radiation. The Committee
therefore emphasizes the need that all forms of unnecessary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided
entirely, particularly when the exposure of large populations is entailed."

- "( Mr. President, so far as I am aware, that statement has not been
challenged from a reputable medical or scientific source anywhere in the
"'orld.

It is a most conservative statement and one must question the

sob:..·iety of anyone who would pass off' the factor of radiation damage as
irrelevant or propagandistic in the consideration of the proposed Treaty .
It is of central importance .

For what the statement says, in effect, is

that we do not knou precisely hovr harmful man-made radioactivity is but
we are certain that it is not good for human health or for the genetics
of the human race .

It is not good, in short, for men, ••omen and children--

and particularly children--in Montana, Arizona, Ohio 1 \4ashington, Hevada,
Mississippi,

U~ah,

Peking or To}:yo .

or 111ssouri anymore than in London, Paris, Moscow,
\/hat the statement says, in effect, is that radiological

technicians in hospitals do not weer heavy protective clotning and dentists
do not shelter themselves for the fun of it when they take X-rays .

They do

so because the stuff of X-rays, as of' nucleru· 1;omb tests, is insidiously
dangerous .

\That the

state~ent

says, in effect, is that it is highly in-

advisable to put e\•en minute quanti ties of strontium 90 o1· 89 into milk
or to add other radioactive isotopes such as Iodine ljl or Cesium-137 to
bread, as though they were vitamin A, B, C, or D.

They are quite the re-

verse in their effect on human health and on the human species .

The state-

ment says, in short, handle man-made radioactivity with extreme care or,
preferably, do not handle it at all.
Yet

;.re

have been compelling our own people to handle it as "rell

as the Russian people and others, and the Russians have been compelling
their people as well as ours and o1hers to handle it .

That has been the

consequence of bomb tests because, beyond the radiation released in proximity
to a test site_, the phenomenon o.t· fA.11out rcsul ts in a wide distribution
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throughout the world. from each detonation "'herever it may occur . And
radioactivity is both ideologically neutral and wholly indifferent to
national boundaries .

When carried in the air-currents and clouds of the

atmosphere it places free peoples, Communist peoples or 'H'hatever, all on
this planet, in the same radioactive boat .
We will find some scientific voices saying that it is not too
bad and very temporary, this thing which has already been done by nuclear
bomb tests to the planetary setting in which all human life is lived.

Ue

will find some scientific opinion which takes the opposite view, that the
genetic damage already done has been very substantial. And we will find
many scientists who say so far it is not too bad but we had better avoid
much more.

Tha·G there are these differences is a reflection not so much

of a disagreement on the facts but of a paucity of facts and of differing
values which are put on the integrity of the individual human life .

Some

are more prepared than others, apparently, to sacrifice this integrity on
the altar of science fo::: l-Tho.t is regarded as a valid scientific or defense
purpose.
In terms of statistics, our o'm Federal Radiation Council has
made some estimates of the human costs of the radioactive by-products of
nuclear bomb tests.

The figures which it supplies are exclusive of the

effects of tbe last Russian test-series of super-bombs in 1962.

The

Council indicates that all tests in the Unit ed States and throughout the
world through 1961 could produce in this nation in this and future generations anywhere up to 15,000 cases of gross physical and mental birth defects and, possibly, up to a maximum of 2,000 leukemia cases and up to a
maximum of 700 cases of bone cancer within the next 70 years .

Other

- 9 adverse health effects of these tests, as, for example, those of radioactive
iodine 131 to children's thyroids in the vicinity of
mountain states of the West, are strongly suspect.
Cesium 137 which has been delivered in heavy

test~

sites in the

The oame is true of

~uantities

to Eskimos in

Alaska as a result of Soviet tests io the Arctic .
Still other ill-effects cannot even be guessed at, as for example,
those of Carbon 14 which has a radioactive life of several thousand years
and may be said, therefore, to have already altered the htu:18.n environment
permanently.
It is all very

we~l

to note that the

stati~tical

projections

suggest only a very smell nunber of AmCl·icans

a~

all tests throll8hout the world through 1961.

But it would not be very

well to tell
quences .

th~t

adversely affected by

to the specific AtJericans who will suffer the conse-

Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian test series of 1962

will add to the specific totals

United States .

~f

health damage already projected in the

It iG clear, too .• that any add.itiona.J. tests in the atcos-

phere by tbe Soviet Union, the United States or any other eountry "'ill do
the same and, in the absence of' a treaty, the addition to the totals can
be large or small depending upon the whim and the capacity not only of
ourselves but of the Soviet Union or any other notion.
It is clear, in short1 that however small the effects appear to
be in the statistical computation, nuclear bomb-testing has already caused
a damage to human health and, potentially, its continuance is a great
danger to human health.

It is so clear that it can be said in this Senate

that we will not find one reputable scientific voice which will advocate
the continuance of bomb tests on the grounds that they are a kind of fillip
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for human health or a genetic stimulant for the improvement of the human
species .
Therefore, the fundamental, if unspoken, assumption of the Treaty
must be that neither this nation nor the Soviet Union seeks the dubious
distinction

~f

being the foremost contaminator of the earth's physical

environment with radioactive substances.

It is the assumption that the

Russians are at least rational enough and human enough to be concerned with
this menace to the health of their children and their grandchildren as we
are with respect to ours.
Those may be erroneous assumptions.

It may be, I suppose, that

the Russians are so obsessed with being first that it is all the same to
them whether the race has to do with the 01ympic Games, the moon, economic
growth, the ballet or radioactive contamination.
obsession is so strong that they are

~repared

It may be that this

to sacrifice even their

progeny to it .
Ev~ _ if

it were so, even if the Russians were indifferent to

the pollution of their own place, along with every other nation's place,
in the earth's environment, then all it would signify is that this Treaty
has little meaning .
good.

It would signify that the Treaty will not do much

But, then, with the safeguards which are provided and assured,

neither will it do much harm.
For what would happen, Mr. President, if we ventured on the
assumption that the Russians did not wish to menace the health of their
own people anymore than we and events proved us wrong?

At some point in

the future, then, the Russians would resume atmospheric and marine testing.
But would they not be able to do that in any event in the absence of a
Treaty?

What is to stop t.hem?

And if' they resume this dubious process
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of denaturizing the physical environment of mankind what is to stop us from
joining in this macabre competition once again't
dent .

Hot this Treaty, Nr . Presi-

There is nothing in this Treaty vThich would stop us in those circum-

stances . And it has been made very clec.r in the hearinss that we intend to
rejoin this competition on very short notice i f it is forced upon us .
ITo, Hr . President, if there is any safe assumption in this Treaty,
it is that there is an absolute mutual interest-- that of the nreservation
of human health--which applies to every nation on th1s globe .
interest will either be pursued in
by the United States c.nd

~he

~ood

This common

faith by all nations--especially

Soviet Union--or all will suffer the conce-

quences of the failure to do so .

There is no escape .

There is no way,

neither sneak nor open, to gain an advantage in th.is matter of health-not for us, not for the Soviet Union, not for anv nation .

For the simple

fact is that i f there ace no atmospheric tests, the geiger counters will
taper their rhythms everY'•here.

If there arc tests, the counters will

click their warninG to human health in every part of the world .
To be sure, l·1r . President, there are other nations--France and
China in particular--uhich, health factors notwithstanding, have already
announced that they will not adhere to this Treaty .

Such states will re-

main legally free to test nuclear '1-reapons in any other environment .
"~>Ti

thout this Treaty such would still be the case .

But

Even at worst, these

countries cannot conceivably pose, for many years, anything remotely
resembling the kind of threat to human health which is implicit in a
resumption of unrestricted nuclear testing by the United States and the
Soviet Union .

With the Treaty effectively maintained between the United

States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, we will have at least a
period of respite which, in itself, will be of some worldwide health benefit.
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And with the adherence of the great bulk of the civilized nations of the
world-- over 8o nations have already signed the agreement--there will be
an opportunity for a vigorous and concerted search for additional ways to
make the Treaty universal in its application.
Mr. President, let me emphasize that there are no grounds for
sanguine expectations that this Treaty, even if it is ratified by this
nation will bring an end to the more dangerous types of nuclear testing.
It is a tangible hope; that is all.
is certain dispair.

But against that tangible hope there

In the absence of this Treaty, the process of radio-

active contatc:i.nation of the environment by bomb tests Hill continue and in
all probability intensify.

Past experience indicates that deploring these

tests in speeches and party platforms will not end them.
Senate resolutions against them will not prevent them.
in the U.N. General Assembly will not inhibit them.
will not stop them.

Introducing
Passing resolutions

Voluntary moratoriums

All these expediencies, short of a treaty, have been

tried and they have not succeeded.

The inescapable fact remains that a

total anarchy in this critical matter still exists in the world.

The in-

escapable fact is that not only this nation but every nation is still completely free at this moment to wreak damage not only on its own heritage
of the earth's environment but on that of every other people.

And the

inescapable fact is that the fear of losing a technological military advantage or the hope of gaining one- -this terrifying fear and this elusive
hope--which in the past, have impelled the Russians no less than ourselves
to overlook the hazards to human health in these tests will almost certainly compel us to do the same in the future.

We shall be so impelled,

and they shall be so impelled, unless this Treaty enters into force and
is scrupulously maintained on both sides.

The likelihood--I venture to
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say, the certainty--is that without this Treaty, the dangers to the health
of all Americans 1 of all human beings, from bomb-made radioactivity, will
multiply.

Neither an embarrassed silence nor a soft-pedaled evasion of

experience and fact changes the reality one iota .
Even if the Tr.:aty

com~s

into force, it is obvious that this

Treaty, in itself, will not halt the continuing and intense scientific and
technological competition to gain a military advantuge or to avoid losing
one .

That will go on for the present on both sides, as is 7ery apparent

from the Senate hearings and from

statemcn~s

emanatinG from Hoscow.

But

what the Treaty does do is to put a muzzle on one aspect of that cocpetition .

1n1at the Treaty does do is to force the competition, insofar as 1t

is now dependent on nuclear testing on both sides, out of the atmosphere
and from the seas and

on·~o

the design boardc and into the factories and

beneath the ground.
The Treaty may not work, Hr . Preoident .

It mny be cheated or

frightened or suspicioned or reserved or exceptioned into discard, quickly
or in time .

It may be, in the end, no more effective than the voluntary

moratoriums and the resolutions or whatever of the past .

And. the world

will go on deploring these tests even as they multiply.
I hope no Senator vill vote for ratification of this Treaty on
the mistaken belief that it is a guarantee that bomb tests will now cease
for all times .

The truth is that in votinR for ratification of this Treaty,

as I have already stated,

-vre

will be voting for a hope .

But let me stress,

Mr . President, that it is a significant, a tangible hope .
And so long as that hope, that tangible hope is present, the
Senator from Montana is not going to tell the people of his state, that
he voted to dash it, to kill it.

He is not going to tell the people whom
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he represents that President Kennedy brought this hope, first raised under
President Eisenhower, to binding treaty form- -this hope that there will no
longer be avoidable increases in the incidence of leukemia, bone cancer,
~d

cancer, birth malformations and other radiologically induced de-

ficiencies among Montanans and Americans and all human beings--but, for a
variety of reasons, he could not support the President.

The Senator from

Montana is not going to say that he could not support the President because
the French government or the Chinese Communist government did not like the
Treaty.

Nor •rill he say it because a prominent scientist out of a large

number of prominent scientists registered the very unscientific fiat of
his own opinion that the Treaty vras a d.read.ful tragic mistake.
he say it because he is convinced that in a

•~steful

Nor •rill

spending competition

on armaments, our taxpayers con outspend the Russians, spend them into
bankruptcy without going bankrupt ourselves.
Nor will he say it because the statistical evidence shm"ed
only a fevr Americans 1.rould die before their time or only a few American
children would be born malformed because of tests already conducted.

Nor

will he say it because the Treaty might also be signed by East Germany and
he vrould much rather that the East Germans begin testing nuclear bombs than
that even the remotest suggestion be given that the United States had, by
getting into the same treaty, somehow recognized the existence of this
East German regime .
Nor will he say it because he believes that Russians, who most
certainly cannot be trusted in many things cannot be trusted even to cease
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denaturiziog their ovrl environmPnt along with ours and everyone else •s on
earth.
No, tt..r . President, the Senator from HontD.na is not going to tell
loiontaoans that he opposed this Treaty on any of these grounds .

Yet all

have been advanced at one time or another in the past weeks as grounds for
rejecting this Treaty.
There is one ground--one ground alone--on which the Senator from
Montana would be prepared to RO home ani tell the people who sent him to
Washington, that these tests in the atmosphere and in the seas must go on
despite the great potential thraat of their

continu~nce

to their health

and to their children's health .
He would not make light of these health risks or pass over them
but he would ask his constituents to acceot thee in all their grim portent
because he •ms persuaded that this Treaty would expose the nation, to a
greater extent than we now are, to a military attack which would destroy
both the oeaning and ouch of the substance of

~~e

life which we have built .

lfe would not ask them to accept the hPalth risks of indiscrioinate
and uncontrolled nuclear testing :if' all he had vras a personal surmise that
the risks of military attack would increaseJ if all he had were vague personal doubts and hesitancies in the face of a new course .

To ask them to

accept the health risks he would have to find in the total record1 specifics for concluding that the risks of military attack would be significantly
increased by our adherence to this Treaty.

He would have to find, in speci-

fics, affirmative answers to these questions:
1.

Is there some nation, other than the Soviet Union--Communist

China, for example--wtich, by not adhering to this Treaty, is likely to
develop a nuclear technology which will approximate ours in the next decade,

- 16 another nation which could close the nuclear gap solely because it tested
and we did not?
2.

The answer is no.

If the Sovi et Union, then, is the one nation which poses a

nuclear threat to the United States in the next decade or more, has that
nation already achieved a substantial advantage, on balance, over the
United States in the military technology derived from nuclear physics- -the
kind of advantage which ,.,e might neutralize by a continuance of aboveground tests on our side even though they also continued to improve their
te~hniques

through such testing on their side7

The answer, insofar as it

is possible to ans't-rer the question, on the basis of fact, knm-rledge and
the overwhelming judgment of the most highly skilled and qualified witnesses
in the nation is no .

3· Is there any reason to assume that our advances in nuclear
science and its application to military technology will be hampered to a
greater degree than that of the Soviet Union, in the complete absence of
atmospheric and marine tests on both sides?

The answer is no.

4. By the terms of this Treaty, will the Soviet Union be legally
authorized to do anything which we are not also authorized to do?

The

answer is no .

5· By the terms of this Treaty are we legally forbidden to do
anything which the Soviet Union is not legally forbidden to do?

The

answer is no .

6. Is there any other than the most remote possibility that the
Soviet Union could engage in prohibited but significant tests without detection7

The answer is no .

- 17 -

7.

If the Soviet Union were to enGage in a clandestine test

and if it were identified or if we had very valid reason to believe that
such a test had occurred even if not identified 1 would we ourselves still
be bound to forego a resumption in testing above ground?

8.

The answer is no.

Is there a significant possibility thnt a single Soviet test

suddenly sprung upon us could so alter the balance of military forces
between the two nations as to increase the risk of military attack upon us.
The answer is no.
In short 1 the answer to every specific doubt which involves the
possibility of the Soviet Union or any nation gaining some unique or
nificant military
yes but no.

ad\~ntage

si~

as against ourselves in this Treaty is not

And because it is no. I cannot in good conscience ask

~v

citizen of Montana to accept the heightened risks to the health of their
families which will be inevitable in the absence of the ratification of
this Treaty by the United States.
If there are not suec"fic grounds of unigue disadvnntage to the
military defense of the nation for
grounds can there be?

On~

re.lectin~

thin Treaty, what other

detects in the few articulate opponents of this

Treaty, a consistent theme which suggests a basio for the remaining doubts
and hesitancies .

It is, apparant1y, the belief that our scientific-military

complex is so superior to all others that if not sub,jected to eny limitation
as to nuclear testing, it will produce an amazing advance in military-nuclear
technology.

The complex, it is suggested, will achieve scme incredible

breakthrough so as to widen, once and for all, the gap as between ourselves
and the Soviet Union.
a

testins_~~itationJ_

That the Soviet Union, cf ccurse, in the absence of
will also be free to seek a similar breakthrough
;

- 18 is either overlooked or regarded of little consequence.

That there are

dangers to health in the continuing process of uncontrolled testing by
both sides, of

c~urse,

is either overlooked or regarded as of little

consequence.
Mr. President, I have the highest respect for our nuclear
physics, our industrial technology, our military leadership and our
capacity to merge them into a powerful complex for the purpose of the
nation's defense.

This complex is second to none in the world.

But

admiration and respect for these capaeities do not and must never compe!
the elected officials of this nation to accept the dictum of this complex
as to what is best for the people of the United States.
The fact is that this Treaty will introduce no curbs upon the
creativity and

~vnamism

of the complex which are not also placed

equal~y

upon such complexes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world.

That

men of scientific genius or highly developed technological specialization
may find s11ch curbs irksome or burdensome is understandable.

But there

is too much at stake hereJ for the nation and for the world, for the
Senate to be persuaded by individual
Indeed, reason

co~siderations

~~d eXPerien~e

of that kind.

must lead us to question most

seriously the course of policy which flows from such considerations.
is the course which assumes that if we will cnly

conti~ue

It

to debar any

restraints on testing, if we will only continue to throw considerations
of public health to the winds, our scientists and our technicians will
create that decisive nuclear
insure the nation's security.

~that

ultimate military gap, which will

- 19 Have we not in reality followed precisely such a course since
the first atonic bombs in the New Mexico flats and over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki?

l·lhat restraints, indeed, what reins have been placed on the

full exploration of this imreense power cf nuclear destruction in all these
years?

Not those of reocey, to be sure .

to be sure .

Not those of a ban on testing,

Through all the..;e years since \-7orld War II there has been

no treaty to bar nuclear tests of any kir.d.
again .

He have tested again and

The Russians have done the same.
And what has happened, lir. Pres id nt?

~le

began in 1945 with

the atomic bomb, with what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate
gap .

By 1949,

f~~

years later, the RuGsians began to close that gap with

their first atomic test.

In 1952, we opened what we believed was the

decisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the first
more powerful hydrogen bomb .

eh~losion

of the immensely

And by 1953, nine months later, that gap

too began to close in a Soviet test cf a similar type of weapon.
So we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, what has
all these years of unre.;tricted testing?

~pened

in

Hao the gap widened with the

free rein vhich has been allowed to the scientific - inductrial-military
complex?

Have we gained the absolute advantc.ge, the ultimate advantage

which will guarantee the nation ' s security?
has not widened.
ing point .

The truth is that the gap

On the contrary, it has narrowed almost to the vanish -

It has narrowed both in terms of the basic knowledge of the

sciences involved and in terms of the application of that knowledge in
military technology .
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Once no nation, except ourselves, cculd have inflicted on any
other, tens of millions of nuclear deaths in a matter of hours.

Now, we

ourselves, no less than others, are suoject to a catastrophe of this
magnitude.
In short, the nation has not been made more secure in any real
sense by this indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit of security by nuclear
development through almost two decades for the

si~le

reason that others

were also engaged in the same indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit.

This

furious and frantic race for superiority in the capacity to inflict nuclear
devastation in me.ss or in caliperic refinement in the interests of national
security in the end

ha~rovided

security to no nation.

It has provided

on1y the assurance that the prospect of immediate and massive destruction
to others will be at
That is vi talJ..y

lea~t

importa~t

as great as that prospect is to ourselves .
insl'rance in the kind of world in lJhich we 1i ve

but let us not delude oursel"!es as to the ncture of the coverage.
provided not security for the nation but
zation is put to the nuclear torch by

a~y

onl~r

We have

insurance that if our civili-

hand, others will be consumed in

the same stupendous blaze .
To cling to the belief that the continuance of indiscri.mine.te
testing is the margin which provides

for~e

security of this nation is to

fly in the face of the reality of experience.

It is not a scientific view.

It is not even an understandable pride and faith in our own great scientific,
technological and military capacities.

It is a

~stic

and egocentric belief

which borders--and I choose the words carefully-- on a most dangerous and
tragic obsession.
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obsess ion.

President, this Treaty, in itself, is no answer to that

This Treaty is but a slender strand of hope drawn painfully

from the web of conflicting interests, hideous feo.rs and fatuous and
immature arrogances out of which are spun the relations of nations in
our times .

It is an evidence, slight and uncertain, but an evidence that

there exists that capacity of courage and that will to life, which may
yet bring to bear on this stifling entanglement, the quiet and simple
power of human reason .
Do

not , Mr . President, look for miracles from this Trcatv.

There are none.
to live for a

This nation, the Soviet Union and the world are destined

len~

time with feet dang)ing over the grave that beckens to

the hunan civilization which is our

camr~~

heritage.

void of darYLess, this Trea+y is a feeble candle.

A~ainst

that

immer~e

It is a flicker cf

light where there has been no light.
The Senator frcm Montana will vote for this light and he will
hope for its strengthening by subseguent acts of reason on all sides.
He will vote for ratification of this Treaty bcca,\se it is, on clear
balance, in the interests of the people of his state and the United States.
He will vote for it because it is a testament to the universal vitality
of reason.
life itself .

He will vote for it because it is an

affirmnti~n

of human
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These Americana recogn1£C that tho tightrope awq• violently Vith evexy
wind

ot conflict--lib ther it blova in Asia, in Africa, 1n

the IU<Ldlo Eest

or olseVhe 1 e .
~e

attenrpt to

Americans will not dismiss as uscle•s or vor:ac, aey rational

t~r

thea vinds o

confllcta .

~ey

vlll not consign to the

vantc-hcap of hiotor,y an or88llizat1on vh1 h has helped to do that 1n tbo
dDscrtc of the U.C!dlc I:ast, and in

India and Pakistan.

~so

Americans will net; u.ke light of tho sacrifice

of the life of Daa HammarskJold, a

barrier of the U. r~ .

he h18h lOOWltains of :Kashmir between

asainnt

«reat and docent

human being 'Who raised the

the hurricanes of hate in the Congo.

....

-

~

llor will these Americans diSIIliss as useless or dangerous to this
Dation the vorlt which the Un1 ted Batioos has clone 1n marshalliD8 an internatiOD&l effort to feed and clothe and otherwise
tbey _,. be, the work

~lp

children in need wherever

to eradicate the scourge of diseases such as malaria

in forgotten comers of the world, to teach the

UDeD11 ghtened

how to farm

better and to develop c<'11Dmi t)" skills and babits which JDa1Y lead them out ot
the morass of a crushing poverty and. a superstitious ignorance.
These American will DOt condemn an organization whose purpose is to

build bridges ot peace and unclerstandin&

81IIODg

D&tians where too few exist,

whose purpose is to pranote a leso cruel and more decent life for men, waaen

and children throughout the world.
We ms.y c!eplore the inadequacies of the U.l.

We

~

criticize what

are saoetimes me&Uesaae tendencies on the part ot iDIDature member-governments.

We

JJUq

denounce the irresp<msibilit)" which leads sene nations to vote grandiose

UD1 ted Watioas actioa 1n some situation or other and then leave by the nearest
exit wbeo the price ot the action is announced in the Assembly.
di~od by

the moral prea.cbments ot certain nations which

ao

We !D8\Y be

DOt accord with

their national practices.
It is proper that we deplore, criticize, and denounce when these
e:xpressiODS are required.

U. B. or aa;ywhere else.

Spades are spa&!s and should be so called, in the
But in calling t.hem·-and I have dale m;y share as a

Uni1Bd States delegate on two occasiQlS to the U. B. General Assembly and in
the Coagress- -I

ao

not believe our purpose ought to be to aestrOT but rather

to 1JI&>row. Mature Americans can recognize the aigni:t'icant cc:mtribution o:t'
the organization to the world, and to this natioo as a part of it, while at

tbe

&aDe

time we recognize tbat the eontributi011 is far

tran enough.

Every Cloy, so far as oo:Jt of us are concerned, is United Sta tea
Day.

fuch of us in our ow way might very well by our actions and words,

365 deyo a yeo.r, re-dedicate ouraelveG

to the pre ervation and enhancement

of all that this naticn means to us and all that 1t otondD tor in the
history or mankind.

And, mcy 1 soy that I can see nothing incon:.is'U'..nt

with the respect and love which we have for our country

4n glv.ing recogni•

tion und carefUl attention once a year to a principal instltutian through
wich thio nation and all nat:tons, if they have the will nc well as the

vordc, mey find the difticul t

~

re!jpect among the world' s peoples

to a '\e::::ent underatanding and mutual
"(:$

nn·7 a t'l.u.t'able peace.
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CO G'R<>l.USE D: A mMOCRACY
Speech Given by Senator Mik

DO NOT l{E.MOVE.

>:anoi'icld (D. , Uontana) before the

Convention of' tho Montana Education Anso iation
l.U.ssoula, Montana, 0 tober 25, 1963
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n d
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che

Thcnk

Agn1n

he

s
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te vith

When I

The one cntitl d

'U'EI.G

acked to

"C~l"'Clis

'l'b.at 1c not atro.nsc 1

&peal~, to~ 1

s verol topic vcre

agg t d.

in a Demo racy

caught oy att nti

o.t once .

ince th word 'com;pr

acsociatcd vi.th the vord "politics . "

is ' io very frequently
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.An overvorkcd, but nevertheleao a ccurate J?hrase stateo

th~.t

politics is the art of cOIII_Jro:::tisc, or "the art of thinza pocsible" .as
Count CavO".lr put ! t a century aso.

Unfortunately, there a.re those who

view both "compranise 1 and. "politics" as equally noxious terms. But i f
.
that vi~v had predominated in our hie tory, this nation would have not
l'..r1own en O!'d.erly evolut~.or.
compronti.se 1

~.

Indeed..: 1dthout the constant exercise of

popule.rly responsive and responoible goYernment such as

we know could not exist.
We have learned, through experience, that compromise is an

entlential ingredien-t of a government by consent.

ow

Sta~e

in a good exam;ple.

The history of ou.r

The tradition of our early years , as you

1-rell knou, is accented. with violence.

Ma.ey of our pioneers were '"C·~e-;:ans

of the Civil Uar and our earl.y hictorJ reflecto some of the vindic-tive
aftermath of thst conflict.

Vigilante law and the quick draw, not com-

:promise and due process, vere an early and accepted wcy of dealing with

differences.

In honesty, hovevcr, I suspect that the actual ca.su&lties

lThich 1-eoulted f1·om this awroach in cll the ee.rly years of the Str.tc' s

settlement do not equal the current output or death by violcmcc in a t-reek
of T/V ues,;erno.
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We ha

hol

socc dio nn

rc , today , c.r no l one; r

Gince th

.,. d l:r.t hang

o.r~ ~G .

Offi

t rather by the

more refined--and, pre umably1 1 oo po.in:f'ul... -p
pers nul.ly and under tande.bly r

rd thi£:

On_ of the k yr; to thio transition h

-

I,

ere t e.ch1 c
be

le! t

.

the g neral.

recognition that an orderly co 1 tJ is inc

ble 1n the bee

the will to con:q>roni c .

fend tho c inotcncc.., in

To

vhich cooxpromiec r pr sent

rq tbic is not t

an bu

of

of publi pow r and n violation of

;

public trust .

But I do eey that the

v1e1o~

which tends to hold compromise in

contez:qt.; is a most unfortunate one .

And it does not maliter whether this

view is applied ih local setting, in

sta~e

to international proolem.s .

or national politics or, indeed,

For it is but one step from the disdain of com-

promise to the application of the opprobnum ooi: appeasement or "sell• ouli"
to all who practice this essential art of
relations .

political- ~1ndeed

of all--human

And to cast. aspersions upon the efforts to solve by compromise,

problems which defy the simple solution is to invite chaos.

And with it,

would only cooe o. return to "the law of the VJ.gila.ntc and the quick draw-this, in a world in which one

~ick dl~w

in the final analysis may be the

last.
If there is aeything which I have learned in more than two

decades in Congress, it is that issues which have only two SJ.des·-and
which can be disposed of largely on the basis of all right or all wrong- -

are for the most part either unimportant, old and settled matters or
rarely 1 new quea;naons which, not inf'l·equently, have "tragic implicatJ.ons .
The Declaration of War against J"apan, for example, was passed in less than
a

~

and vith only one dissenting vo"e in both Houses of Congress .

It 'Has

a cleru:-cut issue but it was also e. tragic issue.

In Congress, today, most defense :measu1-cs are a.lao passed by
nearly unanimous vote .

The necesai ty for them is clea1·-cut and long

established. and. l'er.tains easen ... ially unchtmged in the absence o:t' sl.gnificam;

change in the world situation.

In every Congress, of course, we also pass

- 6 ..

**
a<;e, lllar'..Y o£
..-.,....~..~

t

~ere
wh~

arc !!!o.·e than 18 million per~ on... over 65 yeaz c of

are living out their ftna.l years in poverty and fear

of catastrophic oicknest. .

They ask that the rest of "&he na·tiion consider

"

their paot contributions, i f not the t'ut">..1re to vhich

't·~e

are all headed,

by provlding a oelf.'... respecting and ad.equat. systc:m o1 insu:cance agaim;t.
the major iina.ncial h.&za:::-<ls .

Yet there are scmc·· - c.n<l I uould hope not

too r.mny Amcrice.ns•-who

begrudge rury cuch Dystem t.o old.c:r· citizens

especially if it
~t

~s

~JOuld

under the general control of the

Fed~ral

govcrnuent .

how otherlt.Lce .i.t might be a ...equately provided is not. made cleaz ~
·XJ.:

On

mi~1_ion pc!'SODG

the

ot.~cr

un'.l-;r the

end of the age

E'.g'e Of

,..v .

Gp .<.v .... n,

there are sC!!le 70

Tbci::::' nccdG, if'

WC fl::::'C

to lock

vO

a. stable nut.:. onal futu .• c , .:nclud.e adequate accese to higher .:dt:.ca:tion,
cor.:mcnsurat ... with e.bil.::ty.

!!:hey include in tlD.!lY pru."ts of the r...a:ticn

snfficie.ut cls.sBrooms and liee.chers at all level::: of education.
they include action to open up jobs, to end

ill~~dvised

or avoidable

school Cl.ro:.p- outs , and to develop a :;:omHl, ircll··rounclcd naticne.l

to ·i;he :mounting delinquency problt!illD of our ycrJ.ng people .
knous bci.;tcr that! cdncato!'c that 'the term

<Juvcnil~

And

a:pp:ro.::.c..~l

And no one

ilelinq_uem.y covers a

com:plcx I:IUltitude of factors wh.:.ch will not be d.ispelled uil:Iply because
we have aaoigned them thi.s gJ.ib na;;:1.e and then
the name.

\.TUng

our hands and deplored.
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and aJ.inements 'Within each party.

It is signlfic ant, for exam;pll- , that

in the vote in the Senate on ratification of the Nuclear Test B&n Treaty,

25 Republicans joined 55 Democrats in support of the Treaty vThile only

8 Republicans joined 11 Democrats in opposition.
Anyone Who hac had the opportunity to travel the length and
breadth of this great land cannot but be
vi talit7 in its diversity .

by the tremendous

This que l ity contributeD much to our

strength a.nd our greatness .
the need for compromise .

amaz~d

At the same time it is a major source of

All of the eliverse interests must somehO"..r be

contained within a broader concept of national interest .
laot analysis there is no future for agriculture in this

For, in the
na~ion

there :!.s also a future for industry and the reve::se is true .
no future for protestants unless

th~re

is also a

Jews and others a-'rld the reverse is true.

fu~Jre

unless

There is

for Catholics ,

There is no future for the

~ecro

if there is not alno a future for the v1hi te and the reverse is

true .

There is no future for Uonta::a if there is not also a future

for the other States and the reverse is true.

I n short, the diversities

of interest must in same wey find, t hrough compromise and mutual restraint,
a common meeting place in the national interest and a common hope in the
nation's future.

Unless they do so the immense strength and vitality of

t he whole may be exhausted in t he bitter schisms of the

pa~~s .

- lC -

mankind .

But the complex life of the 20th Century has sharpened

a.nd at a time and under conditions \.'"hen the nation can
The

sh~in$ing

of

dista~cc,

leas~.

th~· 

aff01·d the.'ll.

the greater mobility and forced

association of peoples vrho a short time ego \rould nevc1· have come into
contact with one another, the increo.scd urbanization, the growir..g
population and. the increasing impersonnlism of our economic organization
have all contributed to an atmosphere of greater anxiety and insecurity.
And overall, hangs the ever-present svccter of devastating nuclear conflict , although just a few weeks ago , we witnesaed a gllmmer of hope in
this connection with the signing of the Nuclear Test Bnn TreatJ •
It is not

surprisir~ ,

then, that there is a nostalsic desire

on the part of many to cling to the belief that a return to simpler
days , days of the relative isolation of individuals,
ls a choice still open to us as a nation .
Indeed., there are days when I share it .
news:r;>aper is enough to dispell it.

~ammunities

and states

I can underste.nd this desire .
But the fron~ page of any morning' s

The added presoores i-THhin the nation

and the awesome dangers from vrithout ma.lte l t mo:cc impc-...a.ti ve than ever that

we seek solutions which take full cogniznucc of the complexities of modern
life in thiz nation and in the world.

I f we are to succeed in findinz

oolution::; "c must dra\1 into a common llOOl :;:uch

~.visdom

and sensitivity as

l:18Y be availabl e in all pru:ts of the na·cio!l, in all polltical parties .

- 12 -

may

ai':t'ect i'ar r,\ore people.

Repre:scntati v~o it is almos ...

l3ut in the final analysiG ilL the House of
5\Jli

100 men a.nO. ·.romen meeting in a

men und '\-Tomen and. in the Senate, it is

fa.c~..: - t..c- .....~ac.:c

si·c.uat::.on trying to do the

be::n~

that they co.n to serve the intcrents of 'chc Sta.t"'s and people '\.'ham

they

repre~c;.ti .

There is ••oth.:.ng to

kc~:p S~nator~

:&.'rom pulling "Lhc

apart in th:ts :process , nothin; th.;.t is, except oclf-discipline,

gover~cnt

mutual rezpect, tole... ance for the viovrs or othcrr:; and a willingness tv
CO!J.Promisc.

The cyst em is far from pel:fec:t o.nd the ancwcrs 1-1hhh it

prodll. . .cs are not nccessar lly alweys the best .
s"Litution iz bound together by the
cular

interc~ts

in the

conte~~

d.coir~

l~eve1:-chelcss ,

the in-

\.) se.i'eguaru. and sd.vancc parti-

of the total national good.

It works

lm:·gely because individual Senators arc prepa.ccG. not to press their
concept of what is 100 per cent perfect 100 per cent of th<J tl.Ule .

~/'

~&-<--

j

I have cmphas.:.zed. the legislative branch of the eovcrz.an.e.nt

bccuuoe it is mont fauiliar to me .

But these

obse!~~tions

apply "Lo a

cor..siderab1c dcsrcc to the Executive Branch of the go7crllO.Cn·t.
often 1m f'ol·gct tho.1. the P:c:·esid.ent o:r the United
being faced -vri th u. supcrhuma."'l. task.

Stc;cc~

!!-'vc.r., t..:nc he

decision, a thousand and one precsureo a.re

m:lkc~

dir~c.tc.

Too

iG only e. human

a signL.Lant

upon him frOtl all

parts of the nation as "ell as from o.brood.
terms of the acco:r:co&ltion of these ..:prcssurcs to th... end tll:lt c.1c nation

..

~

stcys on o.n even keel and moves

~

an orderly and unified progress.

The President, too, does the best he can on the bacia of patriotic dedication
to the nation and that applies, may I SEW on the basis of nzy- personal obscrvations for two decades , no less to President Eisenhower than it does to
President Kennedy and to the Presidents ,.Tho preceded them.

.

~
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In these rc:t'larl;;a, I have tl·ied to

c~h~;~.size

thnt the

~rords

"comp:ror:ri.se ~' and 'politi cs 11 are not .:.n themsel vos unsnvo1-y terns, but

ruther they are the otRff of

Succcaoful coapronisa ".s as

fr~edom.

necessu.ry as the air we brea·Ghe .

Th;i. c i.s true for all asr>ccts of govern-

ment- -fram the snnllent

ln

co~ity

~ontana

to the CongresG and Presidency

of the United States .

I hn.ve every conf'ioence that 1ve uHl contimw to exorcise the
good

~:Till

tovm.rds one another and the moderation which have clone so nrv.ch

to DJ.OJ::e this nation great .
awaken a

wru.'l.'l

And w.:le the T/V rresterna 1rill contimw to

and o.n understrn

f:rontier- wespecially since 'tTC

1

£ •...1

r/.o

6rj\

. nostalgia for the cimpler ceys of the
~1ot

have to bear thei.r hardGhips in the

comfort o:: our l.i.v1ne;- rooms --I have every confidence that lunerico.ns also
recognize thn'li the real frontiers of the mod.ern uorld now lie on the fringes
of outer cpacc.

l-Ie vlll thi.nk Uld act ac we mast in order to li~;e and

prosper in this chanecd setting even as the i'rontieramen thouf;ht ana acted
in consonance wlth the l'ealiticn 1.;hich they encountered and so, lived and
prospered.

As educators, I can think of no

~my

in 11hich you might better

pre::pa:t·c thr> youth of the state :'or a. responsible, useful and

sctis?y~.ng

lif'e tha.t'l to heli> them to understnnd i{hat the nation and world tooa;y- are
rcull,y lil:e and. to err_phasize to then the :place of ccre;prccioe, r.mtual a.cc:omm.odation and tolcl•ance in nakina both

~n

in f:cccdom .

November 27, 1963

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. , MONTANA)

Mr. President:
Minutes before the tragedy last Friday, I asked the Senate for
unanimous consent that I might be recognized on the fol1owing Monday at
the conclusion of the morning hour for the purpose of making a statement
on the Senate and its leadership.

The remarks which I had already pre-

pared at that time were intended to set forth a few facts on the Ccngress.
in order to set straight some of the generalizations and the illusions
about the Senate which had been ccming from a variety of informed quarters.
It was a statement of what has been achieved, not by any genius of the
Leadership or by

~cme

Senate establishment but by the 100 Nembers of this

body working in coopem tion and in mutual respect.
repeat the record of 100 Senators.
for its

achievemen~

The statement is, I

We all share in the respcnsibility

as well as for its

shot~ccnings .

There have been

both achievements and shortcccings and both are recorded in the statement,
I hope, in useful perspective and on the basis of fact.

I have recorded

it on the basis of what is tangible in the legislllti ve record not on the
basis of what the Senate looks like at 8:00 at night or whether the Members
are driven or herded or function at their own collective pace and of their
own will .

After

a~Thile,

what the Senate appears to have been in any given

period will be noted, if at all, only by the scholars.

What the Senate does

in a legislative sense in any given period will be felt for a long, long
time by all the people of the nation.
to be applauded.
ment .
nation.

We are not here as actors and actresses

We are here as Senators to do t!le business of the govern-

It is not we but it is that alone, in the end,which counts to the

'·

11-27-63
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So, Mr. President, the remarks which I had intended to deliver
on Monday last in the nature of an interim report on the Senate and its
leadership, now becomes because of this overwhelming tragedy, a final
report on the Senate and its leadership during the Presidency of John
Fitzgerald Kennedy and an indication of what remains to be done under the
Administration of President Johnson.
In the light of what has happened, I have no heart to read this
report to the Senate.
11

I ask unanimous consent, therefore, that the statement,

The Senate and Its Leadership 11 unchanged from what it was as prepared for

delivery in the Senate on Monday, November 25, 1963 be printed as though
read at this point in the Record.

..
Completed November 22, 1963 .

For Release Noon, ifovember 25, 1963.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. , MONTANA)

The Senate and Its Leadership

Mr . President:
Some days ago blunt words were said on the floor of the Senate.
They dealt in critical fashion with the state of this institution .

They

dealt in critical fashion with the quality of the f4ajority leadership and
the Minority opposition.

In doing so a far more important

'

criticism or praise of the leadership was involved.

~tter

than

It is a matter which

goes to the fundamental nature of the Senate .
In this light, we have reason to ce grateful because if what
was stated was being said in the cloakrooms, then it should have been
said on the floor .

If, as was indicated, the functioning

of the Senate

itself is in question, the place to uir that catter is on the floor of the
Senate .

We need no cloakroom commandos, operating behind the swinging

doors of the two rooms at the rear, to spread the tidings.

We need no

whispered word passed from one to another and on to the press .
We are here to do the public's business.

On the floor of

the Senate, the public's business is conducted in full sight and hearing
of the public.

And it is here, not in the cloakrooms , that the Senator

from Montana, the Majority Leader, if you wish, will address himself to
the question of the present state of the Senate and its leadership .
Senator from Montana has nothing to conceal.
best whispered in the cloakrooms .
be said here.

~fuat

The

He has nothing which is

he has to say on this score will

It will be said to all Senators and to all the members of

the press who sit above us in more ways than one .

..
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How, Mr. President, do you measure the performance of this
Congress--any Congress?

How do you measure the performance of a Senate

of 100 independent men and women--any Senate?
at least until an election approaches.

The question rarely arises

And, then, our concern may well

be with our own individual performance and not necessarily with that of
the Senate as a whole.
Yet that performance--the performance of the Senate as a
whole--has been judged on the floor.

Several Senators, at least,

judged it and found it seriously wanting.

And with the hue and cry

thus raised, they found echoes outside the Senate.

I

do not criticize

Senators for making the judgment, for raising the alarm.
I

criticize the press for spreading it.

rights.

Even less do

Senators were within their

And the press was not only within its rights but was performing

a segment of its public duty which is to report what transpires here.

I, too, am within my rights, Mr. President, and I believe I

am performing a duty of the leadership when

I

ask again:

judge the performance of this Congress--any Congress?
any Senate?

Do you mix a concoction and drink it?

How do you

Of this Senate--

And if you feel a

sense of well-being thereafter decide it is not so bad a Congress after
all?

But if you feel somewhat 111 or depressed then that, indeed, is

proof unequivocal that the Congress is a bad Congress and the Senate is
a bad Senate.

Or do you shake your head back and forth negatively before

a favored columnist when discussing the performance of this Senate?

And

if he, in turn, nods up and down, then that is proof that the performance
is bad?

..
- 3With all due respect, Mr . President, I searched the remarks
of the Senators who have raised the questions .

I searched them carefully

for I do not make light of the criticism of any Member of this body .

I

searched them carefully for any insight as to bow we might judge accurately
the performance of this Senate, in order that we might try to improve it .
There is reference, to be sure, to time-wasting , to laziness ,
to absenteeism, to standing still and so
wasters in the Senate, Mr . President?

for~h .

But who are the time-

Who is lazy?

Who is on absentee?

Each Member can make his own judgment of his individual performance .
make no apologies for mine .
Member .

I

Nor will I sit in judgment on any other

On that score , each of us will answer to his own conscience, if

not to his constituents .
But, Mr . President, insofar as the performance of the Senate
as a whole is concerned, with all due respect, theoe comments on timewasting have little relevance .

Indeed, the Congress can, as it has- - as

it did in declaring World War II in less than a day--pass legislation
which has the profoundest meaning for the entire nation .

And by con-

trast, the Senate floor can look very busy day in and day out, month
in and month out, while the Senate is, indeed, dawdling .

At one time

in the recollection of many of us, we debated a civil rights measure
twenty- four hours a day for many days on end.
unshaven .

We debated it shaven and

We debated it without ties , with hair awry and even in

bedroom slippers .

In the end, we wound up with compromise legislation.

And it was not the fresh and well- rested opponents of the civil rights
measure who were compelled to the compromise .

It was , rather, the

exhausted, sleep- starved quorum- confounded proponents who were only
too happy to take it .

..
.. 4 ..
No, Mr. President, if we would estimate the performance of
this Congress or any other, this Senate or any other, we will have to
find a more reliable yardstick than whether, on the floor, we act as
time-wasters or moonlighters. As every Member of the Senate and press
knows, even if the public generally does not, the Senate is neither
more nor less effective because the Senate is in session from 9:00 a.m.
to 9:00 p.m. or to 9:00 a.m. the next day.

In fact, such hours would

most certainly make it less effective in present circumstances.
Nor does the length of the session indicate a greater or lesser
effectiveness.

We live in a twelve-months nation.

It

may

well be that

the times are pushing us in the direction of a twelve-months Congress.
In short, we cannot measure a Congress or a Senate b,y the standards of
the stretch-out or of the speed-up.

It will be of no avail to install a

time-clock at the entrance to the Chamber for Senators to punch when they
enter or leave the floor.
There has been a great deal said on this floor about featherbedding in certain industries.

But if we want to see a featherbedding

to end all featherbedding, we will have the Senate sit here day in and
day out from dawn until dawn, whether or not the calendar calls for it,
in order to impress the boss--the American people--with our industriousness.
We may not shuffle papers as bureaucrats are assumed to do when engaged
in this art.

What we are likely to shuffle is words--words to the

President on how to execute the foreign policy or administer the domestic
affairs of the nation.

And when these words pall, we undoubtedly will

.·
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its responsibilities .

And if we run out of judicial wisdom we can always

turn to advising the governors of the states or the mayors of the cities
or the heads of other nations on how to manage their concerns .
Let me make it clear that Senators individually have every right
to comment on whatever they wish and to do so on the

floor of the Senate.

Highly significant initiatives on all manner of public affairs have had
their genesis in the remarks of individual Senators on the floor .

But

there is one clear-cut, day- in-and- day-out responsibility of the Senate
as a whole.

Beyond all others , it is the Constitutional responsibility

to be here and to consider and to act in concert with the House on the
legislative needs of the nation.

And the effectiveness with which thet

responsibility is discharged cannot be measured by any reference to the
clocks on the walls of the Chamber.
Nor can it be measured, really , by the output of legislation .
For those who are computer- minded, however , the record shows that
12, 656 bills and resolutions were introduced in the 79th Congress
(1945-1946) .

And in the 87th Congress (1961-1962)

resolutions were introduced, an increase of

~.

20, 316 bills and
And the records show

further that in the 79th Congress 2, 117 bills and resolutions were passed
and in the 87th 2, 217 were passed.
But what do these figures tell us, Mr . President?

Do

they tell

us that the Congress has been doing poorly because in the face of an
8 , 000 increase in the biannual imput of bills and resolutions the output

of laws fifteen years later had increased by only a hundred?
us nothing of the kind .

They tell

- 6If these figures

te~

us anything, they

te~

us that the

pressures on Congress have intensified greatly. They suggest, further,
that Congress may be resistent to these pressures. But whether Congress
resists rightly or wrongly, to the benefit or detriment of the nation,
these figures tell us nothing at

a~.

There is a refinement in the statistical approach.

It may have

more meaning than the gross figures in measuring the effectiveness of a
Democratic Administration.

I refer to the approach which is commonly

used these days of totaling the Presidential or Executive Branch requests
for significant legislation and weighing against that total the number of
Congressional responses in the form of law.
On this basis, if the Congress enacts a small percentage of
the Executive Branch requests it is presumed, somewhat glibly and impertinently, to be an ineffective Congress. But if the percentage is
high, it

fo~ows

that it is classifiable as an effective Congress.

I

am not so sure that I would agree and I am certain that the distinguished
Minorjty Leader and his party would not agree that that is a valid test.
The opposition might measure in precisely the opposite fashion.

The

opposition might, indeed, find a Democratic Congress which enacted little
if any of a Democratic Administration's legislation, a paragon among
Congresses. And yet I know that the distinguished Minority Leader does
not reason in that fashion for he has acted time and again not to

ki~

Administration measures but to help to pass them when he was persuaded
that the interests of the nation so required.

.·
- 7 In any event, the statistics on this score are not calculated to
give aid and comfort to those who are in
as a failure at the midway.
As of

N~vember

hurty to mark off this Congress

For here, Mr . President, are the facts:

15, the Executive had submitted 125 legislative

recommendations to the 88th
c~ications.

~

C~ngress,

in the form of messages, letters and

In addition, fifteen appropriations bills have ccme down.

Thus, the total is 140.

But for three of these measu- ea, the Executive

Branch has yet to suggest draft legis 1st ion.

The working total of Executive

requests, therefore, is 137.
Now, of these measures, 45 have been enacted into law .
had conference reports filed and will shortly be enacted.
at the present time are six more.

Two have

In conference

And already passed in the Senate and

awaiting House action are 26 additional Executive measures.

In sum, Mr.

President, 79 of the requested 137 Executive measures, or 58~ of the program,
has, in effect, cleared the Senate.

As a Democratic Senator who needs to

make no apology to any Member on this side of the aisle for his voting
record in support of the President, I, nevertheless, find nothing to brag
about in these figures.
Majority Leader.

But neither do I find any grounds for apology as

I ask any Member to search the Record and find in the

postwar years, a basis for deprecating the work of the 88th Congress on a
statistical basis of this kind.

The 88th Congress has yet to run its course

but about 6Cflp at t.'le midway is not in any sense an inadequate statistical
response to the President's program.

And I would point out that the figure

of laws enacted pursuant to the President's program in the 87th Congress
was 68~.

And I ask the Senate to search the Record and find a basis for

deprecating the work of that Congress on a statistical analysis of this
kind.

- 8 In short, I see no basis for apology on statistical grounds
either for this Congress to date or for the last.
I do not take umbrage in statistics.

But at the same time,

I do not think that statistics,

however refined, tell much of the story of whether or not a particular
Congress or Senate is effective or ineffective.
But there is still another test which persuades me that the
previous Congress under this Administration was and- -before it is done
in 1964--this Congress will be more than adequate.
is a subjective one

This test, admittedly,

Yet it may provide a more accurate insight than

statistics into what really matters most in any Congress.
the test of history.

I refer to

I refer to the capacity of a Congress--any Cor.gress --

to produce what might be called significant legislation of adjustment,
legislation which is in consonance with the forces of change which are at
work in the nation and in the world of its time.

I refer to the capacity

of a Congress to do its part, to do what it must, to keep the nation
attuned to ever- changing national and international realities .

I refer

to the ability of a Congress to come to grips with those few specific
critical issues which confront it and to act constructively on them.
And before it becomes fashionable to hold up to ridicule this
Congress and the last as well, it seems to me appropriate to take a look
at the historic record in the light of this criterion

It seems to me

sensible to isolate from the appearnce of things, from the hundreds of
things which any Congress does, those few specific measures which past
Congresses have enacted, measures which without too much stretch of the

.- 9 imagination may be regarded as significant legislation of adJustment-the legislation which reveals the vitality of a Congress in meeting the
needs of the nation in its time .
The lists which I am about to set forth are arbitrary, to be
sure, but any oversights are inadvertent.

I welcome any additions to

them from other Members who may feel that I have slighted the achievements
of any past Congress .
Let me go back, Hr. President, to the 8oth Congress, to the
first full Congress after the war.

Hhat significant legislation do we

find in those years 1947 and 1948?

This, Mr . President, is the list:

1.

The Congress adopted the r.tarshall Plan and other
urgent foreign aid programa .

2.

It legislated the unification of the Arced Forces.

3· It ratified the peace treaties with Italy, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Rumania.

4. It ratified the Inter-American Treaty.

5· It added the peril-point concept to reciprocal trade .
6. It adopted a peace-time selective service act.
7.

It passed the Taft-Hartley Act.

That is the record of that Congress, of the significant legislation of the 80th Congress, of a Republican Congress in a Democratic Administration.

It is not an unimpressive record, Mr . President, especially

for a so-called "do-nothing Congress. "
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What of the 8lst, of the years 1949-1950, Mr President, of a
Democratic Congress in a Democratic Administration?

This is the list·

1

It expanded Social Security .

2

It authorized federal aid for the construction of
housing for middle income families .

3· I t set up the National Science Foundation .
4

It enacted federal aid to education for impacted areas.

5.

It authorized aid to Yugoslavia.

6. It raised taxes .
7.

It passed the Internal Security Act

8.

It removed the peril point concept from reciprocal trade.

9

It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

10.

The Senate made cloture more difficult to invoke

On the basis of this list can we say with certainty that it was
better than the 80th Congress--of the so-celled "do-not hing Congress"-hut
the Congress which, nevertheless, enacted the Marshall Plan?
Here is the list of the legislation of adjustment for the 82nd
Congre ss; for the years 1951-1952:
1.

It appropriated $179.2 billion, more money than any
peace- time CoiJgres s in his tory.
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2.

It raised taxes to the highest peace-time level.

3. It passed the first universal military training bill in
history

4

It approved the stationing of troops in Europe.

5.

It increased certain Social Security paymentn

6.

It passed a G I

7.

It restored the peril poict concept to reciprocal trade.

8

It continued substantial foreign aid programs

bill for Korean veterans

And so, Mr. President, we

to the first Eisenhower Congress,

co~e

the 83rd, for the years 1953 and 1954.

Here is the liot for ttese two

years:
1.

Its first order of significant business vas to confirm the
titles of tbe states--as against the federal government-to submerged tidelands, to the repository of a substantial
share of the nation's resources in petroleum.

2.

It acquiesced in reorganization plans for the Executive
Branch which grew out of the Hoover Carrmission of the
previous Democratic Administration.

3.

It overhauled tax laws.

4.

It enacted flexible price supports in five basic crops
and reduced dairy supports.

5. It made certain extensions in Social Security coverage and
increased the benefits.

-·
-

~

-

6.

It authorized construction of the St. Lawrence seaway.

7.

It defeated the Bricker amendment.

8.

It terminated federal rent control.

9.

It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

10.

The Senate censured Senator McCarthy.

In the 84th Congress , a 1955-1956 Democratic Congress under a
Republican Administration here is the list:
1.

It authorized the President to defend Formosa and the
Pescadores.

2.

It ratified the SEATO Treaty.

3.

It raised minimum wages from 75¢ an hour to $1.00.

4.

It passed a housing bill.

5.

It set up the soil bank.

6.

It established under Social Security a new program for
the disabled and reduced the eligibility age for women
from 65 to 62.

7.

It authorized grants for medical research facilities.

8.

It set in motion a 13 -year $30 billion road building
program.

9.
10.

It authorized construction of an atomic merchant ship.
It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

.·
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of adjustment :
1.

It established the Space Agency.

2.

It approved a major military reorganization.

3. It extended unemployment benefits for 16 weeks.
4. It authorized a Natinnal Defense Education program.

5· It increased Social Security benefits .
6.

It came to the aid of the railroads with a loan -guarantee
program.

7.

It voted Alaska statehood.

8.

It enacted an emergency Housing act.

9.

It legislated a requirement for full disclosure of
pens ion funds .

10.

It passed amid-east resolution.

11.

It approved the first civil rights measure

12.

It approved the Atoms-for -Peace Program under the nev

in

82 years.

International Atomic Energy Agency.
13.

It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

Then, Mr. President, for the last Eisenhower Congress, the 86th,
1959-1960, here is the record:
1.

It passed another Civil Rights bill.

2.

It authorized another housing program with emphasis on
low -cost housing.

....

.·
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3.

It authorized funds for the study of mass transit problems.

4.

It ratified the Anarctic Treaty.

5.

It began a new program of aid for Latin America.

6.

It approved Hawaiian statehood.

7.

It approved a labor-lll8ll8.gement disclosure act.

8.

It approved a constitutional amendment giving the vote in
Presidential elections to the citizens of the District of
Columbia.

9.
10.

It continued foreign aid programs.
The Senate restored the cloture rule to what it had been in
1948--to 2/3 present and voting rather than to a Constitutional
two-thirds .

That is the record, Mr. President, of the Congresses from the end
of World War II to the inception of the Kennedy Administration.

When all

else recedes into history, when the newspapers of the times yellow on the
library shelves, when all years roll into the good old d.a¥s, these are the
measures, beyond the routine, which will count in terms of the shaping of
the nation and of its place in the world.

And it is

large~

on the basis

of this legislation of adjustment that the historical judgments will be
made.

The number of significant measures is not great in these pre-Kennedy

Congresses.

The range is from 7 or so in the two years of the 8oth Congress

to a high of 13 or so during the two years of the exceptional 85th Congress
under the leadership of the distinguished Vice President (Mr. Johnson).

For

the most part, each two years witnessed the enactment of a total of eight or

- 15 nine items and most of them elaborations or variations on themes already
set in preceding years .
We come now, Mr . President, to the record of the 87th Congress,
the first Congress of the Kennedy Administration.

Here, then, is the

comparable list.
1.

It passed the C'lDllibus .tllrm bill to reduce surpluses and
to provide for a new land-use adjustment program.

2.

It authorized a program of health aid for migrant farm
workers.

3.

It extended uneoployment benefits an

4.

It provided a program of aid to dependent children of the

additior~l

13 weeks.

ULemplcyed .

5.

It increased minimum wages fran $1. 00 to $1.25 and
extended coverage to several million additioLal workers.

6. It established the Area Redevelopment Program .
7.

It increased old age insurance benefits and

pro~~dcd

retirement of men at 62 and liberAlized disability
8.

for

p~yments .

It authorized almost $5 billion in ccw fUnds under the
Omnibus Housing Act .

9.
10 .

It extended the efforts to control water p6llution.
It established the Manpower Training program .

11. It accelerated the public works program by an authorization
of $900 million .

'•

~

16

~

12.

It made a significant revision in the tax structure.

13.

It authorized direct loans for housing for the elderly.

14.

It provided for voluntary pensions plans under the tax laws .

15.

It enacted the Trade Expansion Program.

16.

It passed the Communicat ions Satellite bil l.

17.

It established the Peace Corps.

18.

It established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

19.

It created the U.S. Travel Service.

20.

I t authorized the purcha se of U.N. bonds to save that
organization from bankruptcy.
i~itiated

a federal program on juvenile

delinq~ency.

21.

It

22.

It provided a program of aid for educational TV in the
schools and colleges.

23.

It ratified the Treaty of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation end Development.

24 .

It approved a constitutional amendme!!t abolishing the
poll tax.

25.

It passed a substantial aid bill.

26.

The Senate invoked clot~~e for the first time in several
decade s.

Mr. President, I will

~ot

draw comparisons between the 87th

Congress and those which preceded it .
Each does the best it can.

Each Congress has its own challenges .

But I will say to every Member of this body,

this is the record that counts most.

This is the record which y·ou made.
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It is not the record of the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader.

It is

the Senate's record and as the Senator from Montana, I, for one, will not
make light of these achievements in the first two years of the Kennedy
Administration.

And the achievement is no less because the 87th Congress

did not meet at all hours of the night, because it rarely titillated the
galleries or because it failed to impress the visiting newsmen and columnists .
And now, Mr. President, we ccmo
cularly to this Senate.

to the 88th Congress and parti -

We ccme to this Senate which some have already

consigned to the wasteheaps of history .

We come to its leadership which

some find is to be pitied if, indeed, it is not to be scorned.
Here, Mr. President, I will include in the list--in the list of
the significant legislation of

adjus~ent--not

only those measures which

have cleared the Congress but also items which have at least cleared the
Senate and are awaiting final action.
is for two.

Congress is not for one year.

It

What this Congress will in the end produce we cannot say until

this Congress comes to an end some time in

1964.

Dut to date in this Con-

gress and in this Senate, here is the list:
1.

It has initiated a program which begins to recognize
the full dimensions of major health problems of the
nation and to ccme to grips with them--mental
illness and mental retardation.

2.

It has expended federal aid for maternal and child-health
services and for crippled children.
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3.

It has acted to forestall what Wf"uld 0therwise have been
a crippling railroad shutdown.

4. It has acted to provide f'or a vast expansion in training
and research facilities in medicine, dentistry and related
sciences.

5. It has acted to expand academic facilities in higher
education through grants and loans for construction.

6. It has acted to expand vocational education and extended
f~r

three years the National Defense Education Act and

the impacted areas program.

7. It has acted on the problem of' mass transit.
8.

It has acted to establish a domestic peace-corps.

9.

It has acted to establish a system of federal public
defenders.

10.

It has acted to create a youth conservatinn corps.

ll.

It has acted on a Water Resources Research program.

12.

It has a.cted to preserve Wilderness areas.

13.

It has acted to expand the area redevelopment program.

14. It has acted on the problems of air and water pollution.
15.

It has authorized a substantial foreign aid pr"Sram.

- 19 That is the record, Mr . President, at the half-way mark
in the 88th Congress.

And once again I will leave it to others who

are so inclined to draw comparisons with past Congresses.
will say that no Senator need be ashamed of this record.

But I
The record

is no less a record because it has taken ten months of work to achieve.
It is no less a record because it has been produced by cooperation,
because the leadership wields no whip and seeks no whip to wield.
And the record is for one year not for the two to which every Congress
is entitled.
However this midway Congress may compare with what has
gone before, the leadership would be the first to recognize that
there are inadequacies in it.

And the mos t s erious, in my judgment,

are neither the status of the Civil Rights bill nor the Tax bill.
The most

seriou~,

in my judgment, have to do with the day-to-day

financial housekeeping of the

goverr~ent.

We have got to face the

fact that if we are going to have an orderly fiscal administration
of this government we cannot loop, continue with the practice of
raising every few months, as a ritual, the legal debt ceiling.
Nor can we expect a rational administration af the vast and farflung activities of the Executive Branch of this government if the
basic appropriations bills do not become law until months after the
fiscal year begins .
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I do not know where the answer to these problems lies.

I

do not blame the House and I most certainly cannot blame the Senate

which must await the completion of House action on legislation of this
type before considering it.

And how the Senate is going to discharge

its constitutional responsibilities on appropriations bills by July 1,
the beginning of the fiscal year, when same of the bills do not reach
the Senate until long after the 3oth of June, I do not know.

This

year, for example, the D.C. appropriations arrived in the Senate
Cammi ttee on the 15th of July.
has just arrived.

The military construction appropriation

And the foreign aid appropriation has not even yet

started its jo'tn'ney to the Senate.
I want to say again that I do not place the responsibility
for this breakdown on the House and even less do I place it on the
Senate Appropriations Committee.
Whatever the causes, and they are varied, the problem is
still there.

It has been growing worse over the years and if it is

not faced soon, it will be a standing invitation to national financial
chaos.

Perhaps, what the distinguished Senator fran Georgia (Mr.

Russell) has suggested on occasion, along the lines of dividing the
initiative on appropriations measures oetween the House and Senate
may provide at least a partial solution.

Perhaps, what the distinguished

Senator from Washington (Mr. Magnuson) has proposed in the way of a
division of the Congressional year between a legislative and an
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appropriating session may be helpful..
even more fundamental .

Or perhaps the problem is

Perhaps, it is the persistance of the

illusion of a seven months Congress in a 12 months nation which
is at the root of the difficulty and with this illusion, the incongruity of a June 30th fiscal closing in a December 31st govern ment and nation.
Whatever the difficulty, we are and have been for some
years, I repeat, on a course of increasing disorderliness in the
management of the fundamental fiscal affairs of the government.

I,

for one, would welcome an initiative from the Administration and the
relevant Committees looking to the establishment of a special Commis sion to explore this problem and to ccme up with
its solution .

rec~ndations

for

The job needs to be done and it needs to be done quickly.

If the Senate is not wholly at fault vi th regard to the
appropriations situation, neither is it wholly at fault with regard to
such measures as Health care and the Tax bill.

I deeply regret the

fact that the Tax bill to which the President rightly attacheo such
great importance has yet to be

co~sidered

and disposed of.

But, again,

Mr . President, I will not point the finger of a prejudiced scorn at
the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. Byrd).

Again, the

Constitution and the practice require the House to complete its work
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on a measure of this kind before the Senate begins consideration.
And the House was eight long months in completing action on the
Tax bill.

I do not criticize the House.

sponsibilities.

It

may

That body has its re-

be that it was illusory in the first place

to anticipate a rapid consideration of a bill of this complexity.
And if I do not criticize the House, I most certainly will
not criticize the Finance Committee of the Senate if it, as it will,
in a far shorter time, reports this bill to the Senate.

~

I say,

further, that regardless of his personal attitude on this bill, I
have every confidence that the distinguished Chairman of the Finance
Committee (Mr. Byrd) will report it as quickly as the work of his
committee can be completed.
Here again, Mr. President, as in the case of appropriations,
we have got to face the fact that the Congress, under the Constitution
and its established procedures is not basically equipped to respond,
to reach a decision one way or another, on urgent matters which go to
the heart of our national economic structure.

And in all honesty,

we have got to face the fact that in this instance, a failure to
respond with some degree of urgency to an urgent Presidential request
consigns to the Congress--to the whole Congress--a great responsibility
for whatever consequences flow to the nation from this failure.

- 23 I turn next , Mr . President , to the civil rights measure .

Here,

too , Mr . President, there has been a prolonged delay in coming to grips
with an issue which the President placed before us on the basis of urgency.
Insofar as this delay is attributable to the Senate, I assume full responsibility .

I t has been the announced intention of the Leadership to await

a bill from the House on this measure rather than to seek to proceed
independently on a separate Senate bill .

The hope was to simplify and

to reduce the procedural gamut which--as every Member knows --must be run
by any such bill in the Congress and, particularly, in the Senate .

The

hope was that by awaiting House action we would have been enabled--as a
body-- to face this issue, as indeed it must be faced, whole and directly,
on its merits and resolve it more quickly .
But the House action has been a long time in coming.

It may

be that , in the end, the Leadership will have to suggest alternative
approaches to the Senate .

However that may be, the issue will be faced

and it will be faced whole by this Senate in this Congress .

Regardless

of political consequences , we cannot ignore, we cannot turn our back on
a matter whose long neglect has not only brought us to the edge of and
over the edge of street- violence , but an issue which has seared the
conscience of the nation deeply and opened up fundamental questions
which we have not heretofore had the courage or the inclination to ask
ourselves .
That is the story of the legislative state of the Congress during
the Kennedy Administration and, particularly, of the Senate , as the Majority
Leader sees it .

It is a barebones story, without embellishment.

a story writt en by all the Members and not by the Leadership .

It is

It is a

story of the facts --the significant and enduring facts --as one Senator
sees them at the midpoint of the 88th Congress .

- 24 Let me turn briefly, now, to another matter, to the matter
which is before the Rules Committee, a matter which has cast a shadow
of uncertainty over the Senate.

I do not presume to look down upon any

man from some Olympian height of a superior morality. Most certainlY
will I not do so when we ourselves are largely to blame for the difficulties which have arisen because it is we who are responsible as a
body and we provided little guidance in these matters to staff officials
of the Senate.

Can we say in good conscience that we made it clear that

in the Senate we demanded more of ourselves and, hence, expected more of
all those associated with us in the higher interests of this institution
and the nation which it serves?
That, Mr. President, is the deeper question which is before
the Rules Committee.

And the answer which we give to it will affect

this institution more deeply and for a long time after the sensationalism
of the moment is forgotten.
I turn, finally, to the recent criticism which has been raised
as to the quality of the leadership.

I do not question the right of

anyone to raise this question--certainly not the right of the Senate
and the press, to do so.

I regard every Member with respect and esteem

and every Member in his own way has reciprocated that sentiment, and I
am sure that no Member intends to do me ill.

As for the press, it has

been invariably fair, even kind, in its treatment of me personally.

I

have never been misquoted on any remarks I have made in the Senate and
only on rare occasions have I been misinterpreted and, even then, understandably so.

...
- 25 Of late, Mr . President, the descriptions of the Majority Leader,
of the Senator from Montana, have ranged from a benign Mr . Chips , to
glamourless , to "tragic mistake . "

I have not yet seen "wet- nurse of the

Senate" but that , too , may not be long in coming .
It is true , Mr . President, that I have taught school, although
I cannot claim either the tenderness , the understanding or the perception
of Mr . Chips for his charges .

I confess freely to a lack of glamour .

As for being a "tragic mista.kc, " if that means , Mr . President , that I
am neither a circus ring-master, the master of ceremonies of n Senate
night club, a tamer of Senate lions , or a wheeler and dealer , then I
must accept , too , that title .

Indeed, I crust accept it, if I am expected

ao Majority Leader to be anything other than myself--a Senator from
Montana who has had the good fortune to be trusted by his people for
over two decades and done the best he knows how to represent them, and
to do what he believes to be right

for the nation .

Insofar as I am personally concerned, these or any other labels
can be borne .

I achieved the height of

elected Senator from Montana .

my

political ambitions when I was

When the Senate saw fit to designate me

as Majority Leader, it was the Senate's choice not mine and what the
Senate has bestowed, it is always at liberty to revoke .
But so long as I have this responsibility, it will be discharged
to the best of

my

ability by me as I am.

I would not, even if I could,

presume to a tough-mindedness which , with all due respect to those who
use this cliche, I have always had difficulty in distinguishing from softheadedness or simple-mindedncss .

I shall not don any Mandarin ' s robes or

any skin other than that to which I am accustomed in order that I may look
like a Majority Leader or sound like a Majority leader--however a Majority
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I am what I am and no title, political

face-lifter, or image-maker can alter it.
I believe that I am, as are most Senators, an ordinary American
with a normal complement of vices and, I hope, virtues, of weaknesses and,
I hope, strengths. As such 1 I do my best to be courteous, decent and
understanding of others and sometimes fail at it.

But it is for the

Senate to decide whether these characteristics are incompatible with the
Leadership.
I have tried to treat others as I would like to be treated and
almost invariably have been. And it is for the Senate to decide, too,
whether that characteristic is incompatible with the Senate Leadership.
I have done my best to serve the people whom I represent and,
at the same time, to exercise such independent judgment as I

~

have as

to what is best for the nation as a whole, on national and international
issues.

If that is incompatible with the Senate leadership that, too,

is for the Senate to decide.
I have always felt that the President of the United States-whoever he may be--is entitled to the dignity of his office and is worthy
of the respect of the Senate.

I have always felt that be bears a greater

burden of responsibility than any individual Senator for the welfare and
security of the nation.

For he alone can

·~peak

for the nation abroad,

and he alone, at home, stands with the Congress as a whole, as constituted
representatives of the entire American people.

In the exercise of his

grave responsibilities, I believe we have a profound responsibility to
give him whatever understanding and support we can, in good conscience
and in conformity with our independent duties.

I believe we owe it to

the nation of which all our states are a part--particularly in matters
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of foreign relations-- to give to him not only responsible opposition but
responsible cooperation.

If these concepts , too, are incompatible with

the Majority Leadership, then that , too , is for the Senate to decide .
And, finally, within this body I believe that every Member
ought to be equal in fact no less than in theory , that they have a
primary responsibility to the people whom they represent to face the
legislative issues of the nation.

And to the extent that the Senate

may be inadequate in this connection, the remedy lies not, in the seeking
of short- cuts , not in the cracking of non- existent whips , not in wheeling
and dealing, but in an honest facing of the situation and a resoluti on
of it by the Senate itself, by accommodation, by respect for one another,
by mutual restraint and, as necessary, adjustments in the procedures of
this body.
I have been charged with lecturing the Senate .
these remarks will also be interpreted in this fashion .

And perhaps
But all I have

tried to do is state the facts on this institution as I see them.

The

Constitutional authority and responsibility does not lie with the
leadership.
equally .

It lies wi t h all of us individually, collectively, and

And in the last analysis 1 deviations from that principle must

in the end act to the detriment of the institution.
that principle cannot be made to prevail by rules .

And, in the end,
It can prevail only

if there is a high degree of accommodation, mutual restraint and a measure
of courage--in spite of our weaknesses--in all of us .

It can prevail only,

if we recogntze that, in the end, it is not the Senators as individuals who
are of fundamental importance .
Senate .
tion .

In the end, it is the institution of the

It is the Senate itself as one of the foundations of the ConstituIt is the Senate as one of the rocks of the Republic .

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIElD (D ., MONTANA)

DEFENSE AND 1-:R. HcNAMARA

Mr . President :
For some time the Government Operations Committee has been
inquiring into the circumstances surrounding the award of a contract for
development of the T.F.X. plane .

What will emerge from this investigation,

what legislation will derive from it , cannot be foreseen .
intention to anticipate, much less to prejudge the
But whatever the

outc~e,

the Senate in this matter .

It is not my

C~ittee's

let there be no doubt as to the

findlnga .

interes~

of

It is an entirely appropriate and pertinent

interest .
Public funds are spent in vest sums for military research and
development .

Together with the President, it is the Congreso which pro-

vides the legal basis for the procedures under which these funds are
expended.

It is the Congress which approprintes these fund3 .

It is the

Congress which must answer to the people as to the general wisdom of the
appropriations .

And in part at least, the Congress must enswer for the

effectiveness with which these appropriations are disbursed by the Executive Branch .

The very process of

C~ittcc

ficAnt value in an educative sense .

inquiry, moreover, has signi-

And in the end that which

learned in this or any particular case could well
Rpplication.

ha~

mP~

be

wider legislative

In inquiring deeply into the T.F .X. matter, therefore, the

Committee on Government Operations io discharging a wholly legitimate
function by authority of and on behalf of thP Senate .
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May I say that what has transpired to date in the investigation
has led me to take the floor today.

I do so to give voice to the views of

one Member of the Senate, a Senator from Montana.

The views are not new.

Rather, they are views which have accumulated over the years and have begun
to crystalize in the light of developments in the T.F .X. inquiry.
It is apparent from these hearings, that an immense number of
factors were involved in the T.F.X. contract award.
are of a military nature.
cations.

Some of these factors

Others are broader than military in their impli-

And many are not open or shut tangibles but, rather, involve best

judgments on the part of the men who are expected by the nature of the
responsibilities entrusted to them to make best judgments.
Since such is the case, I do not believe that it is reasonable
to expect any Senator or Committee of Senators to say with certainty that
Secretary McNamara's decision in the T.F.X . was the right one or the wrong
one .

Nor do I believe that the spokesman of any particular branch of the

Armed Services is competent to say with certainty that the Secretary's
decision was the right one or the wrong one.

Nor, in the light of the

factors involved, are all of the spokesmen of the military services combined
competent to do so.

To be sure, their professionalism gives great weight

to such objective militarr opinions as they may advance.

But we should not

overlook the fact that their very professionalism compels them to regard
the development of a piece of military equipment, not in the context of
total costs and national policies but largely in terms of military desirability and specific utility and, perhaps , even more pointedly, in terms of
military desirability and specific utility as seen against a background of
a particular training and service experience.

That is as it shmtld be.

Military leaders are not required and ought not to be requtred to answer

- 3 the questions of the people of this nation as to the additional tax burdens
or the neglected civilian needs which any military coot mny entail .
these questions

~1st

be answered by someone in this government.

they must be answered by the President and by the Congress.

But

Indeed,

And because

that is the case nnd must remain so under a system of free and responsible
government, it is not appropriate and it may be misleading to weigh militerJ
observations on nny weapons - system in a vacuum and to

asst~c

that decisions

arrived at on that basis are e.utomnticnlly the valid decisions.
Even Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, with ell due respect,
cannot speek with certainty as to the correctness of his deciGions in the
T.F .X. matter.

Only time , if even thnt, will permit a logical assessment

of his specific judgments.
The truth is that there arc no certainties in matters of this
kind.
T.F. X. apart, I em inclined to think--and I reason now from
history rather thnn specifics- -thnt at some future date 1t will be seen
in retrospect that Mr . McNamara made many correct decisions as Secretary
of Defense and occasionally that he made wrong decisions.

But for the

present, all that can be asked, all thnt should be asked, of nny man in
his position is that, under the President, he exercise

evc1~

diligence end

full dedication to his public responsibility and do his best to reach the
best decisions .
On that score, Mr . McNamara needs no defense from me or anyone
else .

His record speaks for itself .

His is, in these times, the most

difficult and the most complex assignment in the government after the
President .

His immense international responsi bilitics which dovetail 1dth

those of the Secretary of State involve questions of life or death for
of millions in this country and elsewhere .

~ens

- 4In addition, he has the supreme administrative responsibilities
for the Defense Establishment.

That Department now contains a million

civilian employes and more than two and a half million men and women in
uniform.
Reposed in him is the trust of dispensing public funds in excess
of $50 billion a year, a sum equal to more than the total of all other
federal expenditures combined.
In the light of these vast responsibilities, Secretary McNamara
has been an outstanding and exceptional servant of the people of this
nation.

He was a tower of strength to the late President in carrying the

great burdens of Chief Executive.

His remaining in office at the request

of President Johnson is an assurance to the nation that we will continue
to have the highest possible degree of intelligent, experienced and dedicated
public service in this most critical Cabinet position.
Mr. McNamara was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of Defense
to see to it that this nation has the kind of defense structure which the
President, together with the Congress, deem necessary for national security .
He was confirmed by the Senate to bring about and maintain that structure
at the

lo~rest

possible cost to the people of the United States .

That--no

more , no less-- is what the law, the Constitutional powers of the Presidency,
and the dimensions of the office of Secretary of Defense require of him .
And I should think that every Member of this body would want to consider a
long time, a very long time, before seeking to require anything else of this
Secretary of Defense or any other.

I should think, too, that we would want

to consider a long time, a very long time, before curbing or undermining
the authority of the office of the Secretary of Defense in view of the
critical decisions which must be made if this responsibility is to be
effectively exercised.

- 5If the

of Defense does not hove the authority to make

Secreta1~

the critical decisions '"here else shall it be lodged in this government?
What shall we require of the Secretary i f it is not the critical decisions?
That he serve as a kind of conch or water- boy or, perhap::;, a chaplain for
the military services?

That the final decision::;, not merely tho3c of the
m~:mngement

bRttlefield but of defense
made by military personnel?

and technology in effect , sho.ll be

If I may be blunt, Mr . President, it would

appear , in that concept, that the Secretary's principal functions would be
reduced to fighting for the Defense Esta.blichment's shnre of the total
national budgetary pie and then to keeping the various services from coming
to blows over how it is to be divided.

If I mny be blunt, in prior yecrs

we have had our experience with that kind of an appr(){'.ch.
Indeed, the Secretary of Defense is n sort of umpire.

But the

fact is that the present Secretary of Defense is on umpire who has OO\lght
increasingly to establish service- needs and expcnditureG on the basis of
the requirements of total

n~tional

policies and in response to the admoni-

tions of the Congr ss for economic and efficient operation of the Defense
Establishment .

He is nn umpire who has exercised the authority of his

office to say, not only "yes," but "no," 1lhen necessary, and to make the
"no" stick .

He has exercised the power to say "no," increasingly, to curb

that notorious invitation to waste and extravosence, the cost -plus

contrnc~.

He has exercised the power to say "no" to budgetary requests from the various
services which often and understandably arc

heavily influenced by a one-

service rather than an all- service concept of national defense .

He has

exercised the power to say "no" to separate service purchase of cOOlillon use
items of equipment and supply .

And the Congress knows tha.t this type of

purchasing did much to bring about the stockpiling of military surpluses,

- 6surpluses '\-Those costs dwarf even those engendered in agriculture .

He has

exercised the power to say "no" to certain new l-Teapons developments .

Ho't>Tever,

any such development may intrigue its advocates, from the national point of

view it ought not to be pursued unless it contains sufficient promise and
can otherwise justify itself on the basis of cost- to-potential contribution
to total defense .

And lest there be any doubt of the need of such curbs ,

I shall l'ead to the Senate a list of projects and their cost to the public- projects which over the past ten years did indeed intrigue their advocates
but which 't>Tere abandoned before completion or declared obsolete or surplus
soon after completion .

- 7 The total cost of theoe abandoned projects in the past ten years
is over $5 billion .

To be sure , some value, some experience , may well have

been obtained from each of them.

But let there be no miotnke

abo~t

it .

Taken together they are indicntive, to say the least, of o.n immense and
conspicuous consumption of the nation's supply of talent and facilities for
research aud development .

For this technological high- living , it is the

people of the United Stateo "ho must pick up the check in actual l!lilitary
costa end in the incalculable

costs of a distorted usage of scarce

scientific and technological reoourccs .
Taken together these abandoned projects have represented, too, a
major factor in running up the
property by the armed services .

accumul~tion

of surplus

a~d

oboolescent

For y<:.D.rs in the past the total of such

property dioposed of at a fraction of coot hno fluctuated between
and $8 billion annually .

$1~

billion

To put this figure in some kind of perspective 1

consider thr.t it means thnt every year our military establishment got rid
of, at e fraction of cost , assets with a value anywhere from about equivalent
to , to double the amount that the United Kingdcm expends on nll ito armed
services for all purposeo .

In short, the British h£we been running their

Army, Navy and Air Forces yenr in and year out for something leso than the
cost to uo of our annual loooeo through cxcer::s militnry accumulo.tions or
obsolescence .
Mr . President , the Secretary of Defense, has , indeed, oaid "n0"
with frequency during the three years in which he has been in office .

Yet

there is nothing to suggest that because he has done so our defense position
in the

~rorld

is any less effcctive , nny less impressive than heretofore .

On the contrary, ouch indications as there nre suggest thnt the Defense
Establishment is better prepared and more cnpuble of meeting a
range of possible military challenges to this nation .

~•icier

- 8 There is a good deal of talk about the high cost of government
and the need to cut expenditures.

In the light of this talk, I cannot

imagine that anyone in the Senate would wish to undermine the Secretary's
authority to say "no" to the ever- present and immense bureaucratic pressures
for expenditures within the Defense Establishment.
away at almost any item in the budget.

To be sure we can chop

The Department of State, for

example, had a budget request for $374 million this year and a show of
economy can be made by reducing it and closing a
the process.

fevT

consulates abroad in

But we are deluding ourselves if we believe for one moment

that it will be possible to curb the

grov~h

in the cost of the federal

government, let alone reduce that cost significantly unless someone has
the authority, under the President, to act decisively in connection with
defense expenditures .

For that is where the great expenditures are.

In

the 1964 budget, for example, $53.7 billion was proposed by the President
for the Defense Establishment .

The

neA~

allocation in size in that budget

was $11.3 billion for Treasury, and of this total $10.2 billion represents
an allocation for interest on the public debt .
I ask the Senate to note, further, that the figure of $53.7
billion in new obligational authority for the Defense Department represented
the final figure proposed in the budget submitted to Congress early this
year.

But before it was arrived at, Secretary McNamara had pared down

resuests from all of the individual military services under his supervision.
When these individual requests initially reached his desk they totaled the
great sum of $67 billion.

In other '\-lords, Mr. President, the services,

left to their own individual devices . would have sought of the Congress

$13.3 billion more than the Secretary of Defense, in the end, allowed them
to aok .

And yet in spite of this enormous cut , the $53.7 bHlion requested

for the armed services for fiscal year 1964 was stHl a record high.

- 9 With all due respect, would the President have been in a position
to direct, except arbitrarily, a cut of $13 . 3 billion in the combined requests of the various services?

With all due respect, would this body or

even its exceptionally capable Armed Services Committee have been able to
say "no", with any degree of confidence, to the tune of a reduction of

$13. 3 billion? \oJould the equivalent body in the House'Z

1lith all due

1

respect, I think the Congress would have had great difficulty in knowing
where to enter the jungle of Defense finance and I doubt that we would have
gone much beyond. the fringes for fear oi' jeopardizing the necessary defense
of the nation .
And, so, Hr . President,
with authority.

we

arc back to a Secretary of Defense

If we did not have one he would have to be invented .

I am persuaded that

we

have in office an exceptional Secretary

of Defense who is attempting to meet the full responsibilities of that
office .

I believe that he is exercising with great determination, intel-

ligence and knowledge the authority which must go with those responsibilities .
It would seem to me that

we

ought to do whatever

do to help him in his responsibilities .

For

we

we

are

abl•~

to

are all in agreement that

we are seriously challenged by Communist power from abroed in a military
sense as well as in other ways .

We are all in agreement that against the

military challenge there must be posed the necessary military defense for
the security of the nation, at whatever the cost.
But the extent of the challenge from abroad is a variable depending upon changes in the world situation .

The phrose "necessary military

defense" is a variable, subject in interpretation to infinite extension.
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And the phrase "at vrhatever the cost" is a blank cheque which if taken in
a literal sense, can be drawn, in the end, upon the total resources of the
people of the United States.
These are realities, Mr . President, which are just beginning to
dawn upon us .

These are realities with which, I believe, the present

Secretary of Defense is seeking to grapple. These ere realities to which,
as legislators, we must turn our attention.

It seems to me that we must

begin to think deeply as to how the dimensions of "necessary military defense" may be drawn and redrawn more accurately in the light of an everchanging international situation. And we must ask ourselves, too, how
are we to keep "whatever the cost" of that necessary defense at a rational
level in order that, in the end, it does not overwhelm the nation.
These are not empty questions nor are they theoretical questions.
"Necessary defense" has been defined and redefined consistently over the
past decade as more and more .

'~-lhatever

the cost" has risen from $37.8

billion in fiscal 1954 to the $53·7 billion which was requested for fiscal

1964. And the latter figure, as already noted, ,.,as presented to the Congress after the Secretary of Defense had reduced

~bthe

initial service

requests of $67 billion by $13·3 billion.
May I say that it is understandable if, in defining t he dimensions of necessary military defense, those who have direct military responsibility are inclined to leave a margin for safety.

That is appropriate;

it is proper; it is to be commended rather than criticized. After all,
those who have these responsibilities are grappling in an area which is
both inexact and ever- changing and one which is not subject, in the end,
to computer-calculation.
I , for one, do not begrudge the cost of a margin for extra
safety- - a substantial margin- -and I believe the people of the nation

- ll are similarly inclined.

But the problem still remains . We must

hP

eveJ.·-

mindful lest in determining what is necessary for military defense we become so obsessed with t he extra margin for safety that it grows into a
fear-fed monster which, in the end, devours that which it is designed to
safeguard.
In the same fashion, our willingness to pay "whatever the cost"
of necessary defense must not be an invitation to acquiesce in administrative procedures within the defense establishment which tend toward wasteful rather than prudent expenditures .

And I would emphasize that in this

area- -in the area of management procedures--there is no excuse for an excessive margin of safety.

Expenditures for the management of the defense

establishment, unlike the determination of over-all defense needs , can be
subject to reasonably exact control by computer- calculation, by accounting
procedures and by the many other tools of oodern American buuiuess management .
If 1 may sum up, f.ir . President, two questions ought to be everpresent in our minds in considering any problem of defense:
1.

How are we to insure that this government defines and re-

defines "necessary military defense" with full adequacy but without fantastic and obsessive excess, in a world situation in which "necessary
defense" is an ever- changing but not necessarily an ever-increasina
quantity?
2.

How are we to design the procedures within this government

and withi n the Defense establishment so that they wi ll provide t his fully
adequate necessary defense at the least cost to the people of t he nation
who , in the end, must pay for it?

- l.2 -

There is no formula by which these questions

may

be

answere~.

For years, we have been ordering and re-ordering the processes of the
Executive Branch, in order that that branch may define more accurately
for the President the nature of the international dangers which confront
us. For years we have been ordering and re-ordering the structure of the
Defense Department, in an effort to limit expenditures to the necessary.
Yet year after year the problem has loomed larger.
If 1h ere is not an easy formula, there are certain negatives
which might be examined for the light that they shed on what may stimulate
defense costs far beyond the necessary.

These are the things, it seems to

me, we must not do, i f we mean to keep a rational perspective on the
realities which face us in the world and, in the light of them, hold expenditures for defense at a rational level consistent with national

eec~~ity.

These negatives 1 these tEntative observations 1 I should like to leave with
the Senate in concluding my remarks.
In defining and redefining the dimensions of "what is

necess~"

for defense, we are likely to leave a most wasteful, rather than a desirable margin for safety unless these realities are recognized anew:
1. That, under our system of government 1 there can be no
substitute for the preponderant Judgments of the President as to the total
and the ever-changing challenge from abroad to this nation.

These judg-

ments must provide the key for determinin6 the essential dimensions of
what is militarily necessery for the security of the nation.
2. That, in making his judgn\ents, the President must necessarily depend on advice and counsel from whatever sources he deems appropriate--military and civilian--but once his judgments are made, it is inappropriate for any permanent official of the Executive Branch--military
or civilian--to do other than his best to

c~

them into effect.

- 13 3· That the President •s judgments-- once made--in this
connection are subject to challenge not by permanent officials of the
Executive Branch--military or civiljan--but only by the Congress, acting
as the Constitution makes cl ear that it can and shall act, by legislative
initiative and by legislative over31ght.

4.
~ecretary

Tha~ ,

under the President and the lave of the lend, the

of Defense has the authority to establish--vith the help of the

Joint Chiefs- -the strategic concepts which shall set for all the

a_~d

services, t heir appropriate roles in mainto.ining the kind of defense vbich
the President and the Congress have

~eemed

necessrurJ for the nation ' s

security; and, further, that within the Defense Establishment, the Secretary
of Defense has authority to cont.rol administrative procedures aod pr actices
for efficient acd effective operatiooa .
And if I may continue with the negatives,
like also to stress that we are not going to

g~t

~:.

President, I shouid

an effective and efficient

defense at a tolerable cost unless it is recognized in all frankness :
lo That the Defense Est9.bli3hment, as the largest single
E_UXcbaser of goods and services in the nation, bas

co~re

to occupy a substan-

tial position in the civilian economy of this nation; tbat1 in this connection, what the Defense Department does or does not do bas come to have great
imoortance not only for defense but for the well-being of bus iness, labor
and whole communities scattered throughout the nation.
2.

That, in the li§ht of this economic position which the

Defense_Establisbment occupies it would be a gross naivete to assume that
pressures--increasing pressures--will not be present for decisions to be
made by the Defense Department not solel,y on consid.erations of necessary1
effective and

~fficient

defense--and may I say that colloquies on the floor

between Senators from various of the laraer states

unde~score

this

point~

- 14 3. That however understandable these pressures may
as a Senator from Montana I hope that I try to do as much for

my

be -- an~

state aq

any other Member--the nation will be ill- served if there is not within this
government those attitudes and those conditions for administration of the
affairs of the Defense Establishment which
~nd,

pe ~mit

the decisions, in the

to be made on the basis of_gecessary, effective and

ef~ient defen~.

Mr. President , in making these remarks today, I have not been
unaware of the eloquent farewell address of the former President, Mr.
Eisenhower, in which he warned of the need to guard against the development
of an industrial-military complex of power in the nation.

Nor have I been

unmindful of dangers to that classic doctrine of freedom-- the doctrine of
civilian supremacy.
And yet, with all due respect, I do not see the principal diff i=
culty which confronts us in these contexts.

If there were ever to be an

imminent danger to freedom in this nation of the kind alluded to by Mr.
Eisenhower, it is not likely to be the cause of the failure of popularly
responsible government.

Rather it is likely to be the consequence of the

failure of civilian responsibility in the Congress no less than in the
Executive Branch of the government.

And I want to say to the Senate, that

this system of freedom which we know will not fail .

It will not fail so

long as an excessive fear does not drive us to an obsessive interpretation
of what is necessary for defense .

It will not fail if we are

prep~red

to

face the economic and social difficulties which confront the nation and
deal

wit~

them on their own merits--their civilian merits--rather than to

seek to evade them, or to act on them haphazardly and inadequately and
ineffectively because we find it easier to act under the camouflage of an
inflated concept of military necessity.

- 15 These, then, Mr . President, are some of the observations which
I have to make .

They are observations stimulated by the work of the

T.F.X. inquiry which is being conducted by the very able Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. McClellan) and his distinguished colleagues on the Government
Operations Committee .

They ere observations growlng out of a very high

respect for the patriotic dedication and the ability with which l-1r. l·1c:Nama:-a
is seeking to ccrve the nation under the President.
It is incumbent upon all of us, it seems to me, not to ignore
these larger implications of the T. F.X. matte:-.
the President, the Congress, the
to face them, to discuss
Constitution.

th~,

pres~

It is incumbent upon us--

and the people of the United States--

and) as nccesaery, to cct on them within the

Department of the Army
Projects Canc~lled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

P:t·ime

Contractor!~

( s)

MISSUES
DART

1958

44.0

Aerophysics Corpo

A wire- guided surface-to-surface antitank missile with a range
of approximately 6,000 yards. This missile system was cancelled
since the French designed SS- 10 proved to be more effective in this
r ole .
ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHIClES AND RELATED EQUIIMENT

VIGILANTE

1961

32. 0

Sperry Gyroscope

A 6-barrel, 37mm automatic anti-aircraft gun system mounted on a
full- track vehicle chassis and. complete vrith radar fire control.
This gun system was cancelled since the MAUlER surface- to- air
missile system has been designed and should be more effective in
the anti-aircraft role intended.
OTHER EQUIPMEW2

AN/USD 4 Drone

196o

RepubJic Aviation

A medium endurance survelliance drone: capable of carrying a
450 lb . pay- load for 55 minutes duration. This drone program
was cancelled since it was considered that the AN/USD - 5, when
developed, could perform this mission as well.
AN/USD 5 Drone

1962

Fairchild Astro
Corpor ation

A long- endurance surve:nJ.ance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb ..
pay- load for 90 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled
since cost effectiveness studies have indicated that the Air Force
with their F4c and RF-101 mod.erniz.ation program can perform the
mission mor e effectively.
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Year Cancel.led

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)
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AIRCRAFT:
SEAMASTER

1959

330.4

t-1artin Co.
.Harlan Const o Co.,

Jet powered mine laying senplaneo Specialized for low
altitude attack against submarine pens. Cancelled because of
technical problems, high cost and slippage in progriJI!l~
MISSilES:
REGULUS II

Ling Tempco
L.F. Stillwell
<.. Co .

1958

Surface-to-surface missile with 500 nautical mile range
and weight of ll,570 lb. equipped w:lth Shot'an grid guidance .
Cancelled because it became redundant vhen better systems were
assured before its complP.tion.
PEI~EL

Fe.i=child A/C

1957

Air-to-surface missile wi-ch 20 nautical mile raoge and
weight of 3300 lbs. equipped with active radar hominp plus
acoustic torpedo. Cancelled for consideration of reasons
including state-of-the-art advance~, chatl8ing r!lilitary requirements and cost considerations.
CORVUS

1960

8o.o

Ling Tempco

Air-to-surface missile with 170 nautical mile range and
weight of 1750 lbs. equipped with passive or semi-active radar
homing. Cancelled for consideration of reasons i:1cluding stateof-the-art advances, changing military requirement,s, cost co:lsiderations, plus contractor difficulties .

EAGlE

53 .. 0

Bendix Aviation

Air-to- air missile with 70 nautical mile range and weight
of 14oO lbs. equ~.pped with midcourse command plus active radar
homing. Since this was the missile system for the Nissileer
aircraft, it was cancelled ~..hen Missileer w·as dropped .
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Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contractor( s)

MISSILES:
METEOR

1954

M. I . T.

Air- to- air missile with 10 nautical mile range and weight
of 510 lbs. and semi-active homing. Cancelled in weeding out
of early air- to-air missile projects in favor of more promising
air-to- air projects.
RIGEL

Grumman A/C

1953

Surface-to- surface missile with 4oo nautical mile range
and weight of 19,000 lbs . equipped with ramjet, command midcourse, plus radar homing. Cancelled for same weeding out
process as METEOR above, plus it was a competitor to REGULUS .
DOVE

1955

33·7

Eastman
Coo

Kode~

Air- to-surface missile with gravity bomb and weight of 1300 lbs.
equipped w1 th infrared homing. Cancelled because of changing requirement s plus technical difficulties.
SHIPS:

Submarine Underwater
Propulsion Systems

1954

General Electric
Allis-Chalmers
Elliott Company
vlestinghouse
Elec .

Work began in 1945 and continued to 1954 on closed and semiclosed propulsion cycles, all of which could be used to propel
submarines in fully submerged conditions. Cancelled because of
the success of nuclear propulsion.
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OTHER :
~mRS ,

Sugar Grove

70. 0

Tidewater Constr, Co .
Patterson-Emerson
Constr .

A 6oO 'diameter, rotatable radio antennae device ~o
provide an improved capability in space research and intelligence gathering activities. Cancelled because costs
increased from initial estimate of l~ss tban $8o million
to over ~190 million and, during ·~be period when the structural design pbase of the antennae was in progress, other
scientific techniques capable of performing the antennae
functions were perfected.
ZIP Fuel

1959

123 . 0

Callery Chem. Co.

Fuel of 5~, higher energy than jet fuel, for use in
gas turbines . Cancelled because of bigh cost and technical
difficulties.

Department of the Air Force
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title
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Prime

Contractorill

AIRCRAFT:

5ll.6**

ANP

Boeing/Gen. Dyna.,
GE/P&W

This was a program to develop a nuclear-powered long-range,
long endurance aircraft for possible strategic application. The
program was cancelled because it had inadequate military potential
in any form which was technically feasible.
F-lo8

North American

1959

This program was for development of a long-range ( 1000 mile)
supersonic manned interceptor, equipped with a highly sophisticated
fire control system, to counter the airborne bomber threat of the
1960's and 1970 1 s. The overall program was cancelled because of
the relative decrease of the manned bomber threat.
XF-103

1957

10~.0

Republic

This was an advanced fighter concept for a titanium mach
3.0 fighter, powered by a dual cycle (turbojet/ramjet) propulsion
system. It was cancelled primarily as a result of technical
problems (e.g. poor visibility, J-67 engine problems) rising costs,
and greater promise of the F-108 program (e.g. long range) .
F-107

1957

100~0

North American

This was a fighter-bomber development program in competition
with the F-105. It was cancelled in favor of the latter, which
proved to be a superior weapon system.
J -83 Engines

1959

55o0

Fairchild

This was a small lightweight turbojet engine in the 2000 lb.
thrust xange, for possible missile or aircraft application. It
was cancelled in favor of a competitively superior engine.

it·

if*

Tentative; pending termination proceedings.
AF costs only.
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AIRCRAFT:
C-132

1957

54 .. 0

Douglas

This was a turboprop hea•ry long- range transport designed to
carry 100,000 lb . payload . It ~"as cancelled because of poten-r.ial
high cost and because the C- 133, although not capable of as high
a payload, appeared sufficiently versatile to meet Air Force needs .
T-61 Engine

1959

37-4

Allison

This was an internal combustion burboprop engine of advanced
designo Cancellation was based on the fact that the engine had not
been designated for application to any specific future weapon system.
Vertol

H-16

This was an extremely large fuselage, twin-rotor, high capacity
helicopter . aampered by technical problems, delays and co3t overrun, it was c&ncelled as a resul.t of reappraical following the crash
of an exper imen-r.al model.
MISSilES :

NAVAHO

North Ame.rican

1957

This was a supersonic surface-to-stxface intercontinental
strategic missile . It was canceLled in its flight test phase,
having been overtaken by the accelerated reg~ development programo
SNARK

677·4

Norttu-op

This was a subsonic surface-to- surface intercontinental
strategic missileo Although completely developed and placed in
the active inventory, it was rendered quickly obsolete by the
accelerated ICBM program.
GPll.-63 RASCAL

448. 0

Bell

This was an air- launched air- to- surface missile for use by
strategic for ces (B- 47)o The program was cancelled in favor of
the inherently superior Hound Dogft
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MISSilES :
Douglas

GAM-87 Skybolt

This was a ballistic missile to be air launched from the B- 52
or Briti sh Vulcan bomber s . Cost escalation, time delay, revised
estimates of actual performanace, and availability of other ways to
do the job better on a cost- effectiYeness basis caused cancellation ..
TAWS (Land Based)

1957

118.1

Bendix

This was a land-based surface- to- air missile for the air defense
missiono Air For ce effort terminated when short range surface..'to- air
missiles wer e designated as an Army sole responsibi lity.

lo8.4

Mobile MINUTEMAN

Boeing

This program consisted of the present Minuteman surface-tosurface missile transported and fired. from raiJxoad carso It was
cancelled because of high cost and little military value versus
other systems .
Q- 4 DRONE

1959

84.4

Northrop

This was a small turbojet drone to be used by Air Defense
Command for trainingo It ~ras cancelled because of a lack of
funds and a change in requirements.
SM-73 GOOSE

1958

Fairchild

This was a subsonic long range decoy missile for strategic
application, to be ground launched as an electronic countermeasure
device . The program was overtaken by other developments (eog~ GAM- 72
Quail) and by changes in concept of operation.
GA.'i- 67 CROSSBO.·!

1956

Northrop

This program ~ras the original. air-to- surface anti- red.iation
missile (ARM). The modern version is the SHRIKE. It was cancelled
because other systems were considered more favorable and because of
uncertainties in the guidance systemo
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OTHER:

AN/I..:m-27

1959

142.0

Sperry

This program was a complete integrated electronic countermeasures system for the B-52. It was cancelled because of the
extreme cost.
Hi Energy Bor on
Fuel

1959

l35o8**

Olin Mathieson)
others

The program was for the development of fuel to power a
Chemically Powered Bomber. It vras cancelled because it was
overtaken by other developments, because of technical problems
encountered, and because the requirement was cancelled for the
specific aircraft to which it had kno•m application.

